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WHY THE DELAWARE COURTS MUST PROSCRIBE ALL
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INTRODUCTION
After years of rationally apathetic slumber, the shareholder has
reemerged, bulked up and ready to challenge management for
control of America's corporations.' The managers, fresh off their
victory in the "hostile takeover" wars, are ready for the challenge.2
The shareholder's weapon?-the lowly proxy. While shareholder
voting was once considered a mere formality, institutional investors
with tremendous stock holdings have given the corporate election
process a new vitality.' These institutions, which own over half of
the equity in U.S. corporations,4 have been using the proxy voting
system to limit management excesses and to replace the leadership
of underperforming companies. They have demanded that corpora-
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1 See, e.g., PAUL R. BERGIN, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1988 PROXY SEASON 1 (1988) (stating that "institutional
shareholders are continuing to become more active participants in the proxy voting
process-taking their voting rights more seriously and using the proxy process to
defend and promote their interests").
ISee, e.g., Clare O'Brien & Alan S. Goudiss, Hostile Takeovers in the '90s: What Are
Boards' Options in Fashioning Responses?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at 7 (stating that
recent legal developments, particularly in the courts of Delaware, "reflect a trend
toward permitting broader latitude in fashioning responses to hostile takeover threats
and greater judicial deference in reviewing a corporate board's selection and
implementation of defensive measures").
I See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520,
570 (1990) (stating that "[i]nstitutional ownership is beginning to translate into
significant voting power").
I See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447 (1991) (reporting that in 1989, institutions
held over 45% of total equities in the United States). Many of the largest companies
are the most heavily owned by institutions. For example, Capital Cities/ABC is 88%
institutionally owned and Digital Equipment is 71% institutionally owned. Id. at 447-
48 & n.5. By 1995, institutional holdings had increased to 54.2% of all equity
ownership. See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK
1-1 (1995).
(423)
424 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145: 423
tions be governed for the benefit of the owners of the firm, the
shareholders.5
Management has responded to this new shareholder activism by
constructing barriers to the voting process.6 Managers have moved
election dates, manipulated the size of the board, enforced owner-
ship limits and placed stock into friendly hands-all to reduce or
eliminate the possibility of shareholder success in a corporate
election.
7
The judicial response to this intrusion on the shareholder
franchise has been mixed. While the courts have described the
shareholder franchise as deserving of judicial protection,8 there is a
marked unwillingness among judges to interfere with managerial
decisionmaking' In many cases, the courts have acknowledged that
even though a corporate maneuver will interfere with a proxy fight,
they will not invalidate the measure because the impediment was not
the primary purpose behind the action."° In other cases, the courts
blessed actions that seriously interfered with an election but did not
totally preclude the shareholder's chances.' In still other cases, the
courts argued that they needed to apply a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the degree of interference with an election was
proportionate to a reasonably perceived threat to the company.
12
- See, e.g., CalPERS Says Challenge to Boards Is Working, LA_ TIMES, June 1, 1995, at
D3, D8 [hereinafter Challenge to Boards Is Working] (describing how the California
Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS") has been petitioning corporate
boards to create written guidelines for practices that "ensure the protection of
shareholder rights").
6 SeeVIRGINIA I. ROSENBAUM, TAKEOVER DEFENSES: PROFILES OF THE FORTUNE 500,
at 7-11 (1987) (describing the various methods by which managers try to prevent a
change in corporate control).
7 See infra Part H.
8 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995)
(declaring that "[t]his Court has been and remains assiduous in its concern about
defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by
disenfranchising shareholders").
9 See id. at 1386 (arguing that "'courts will not substitute their business judgment
for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance,
within a range of reasonableness'" (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994))).
10 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.AIl1510, 1990 WL 114222, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl f) (stating that "board action taken in good faith ... may
be valid even though it affects in some respects the exercise of the franchise").
" See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch.
1989) (finding that even though corporate defensive measures placed the insurgents
in a position where they would have to "out poll management by a factor of 4 to 1,"
the actions were not preclusive of the shareholder franchise).
12 See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (declaring that "[i]n certain
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This Comment proposes that the courts need to take a stronger
stand against managerial interference with shareholder voting. The
various tests the courts are applying--the primary purpose, total
preclusion and balancing tests-are too deferential to management.
The vote is the shareholder's only tool to oversee and discipline
corporate management. With the elimination of the unsolicited
tender offer, shareholders must vote management out of office if
they are to recognize the gains from a change in control."3 The
shareholder vote is at the heart of the economic principles that drive
corporate efficiency, 4 as well as the fiduciary principles that
legitimate managerial exercise of power over the vast amount of
assets that management does not own. 5
Specifically, this Comment will argue that courts must not allow
managers to purposefully interfere with the shareholder franchise.
Additionally, the courts must carefully scrutinize defensive transac-
tions that, although not primarily intended to interfere with the
ability of shareholders to vote, have the effect of constraining the
ability of shareholders to oust incumbent management. Presently,
courts do not carefully examine the effect of defensive measures on
the shareholder franchise.' Because the shareholder franchise is
so vital to the efficient operation of the modern corporation, the
court must apply the strictest level of review to actions that impede
circumstances, a court must recognize the special import of protecting the
shareholders' franchise within Unocats requirement that any defensive measure be
proportionate and 'reasonable in relation to the threat posed'" (quoting Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985))).
11 See Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards ofJudicial Review of
Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BuS. LAW. 647, 648 (1992) (stating that
"although the directors may be permitted to 'just say no' to a proposal to change
control or corporate direction if they believe their current plan is superior, the
stockholders ultimately retain the right to replace the incumbents with directors
committed to the policy preferred by the holders of a majority of the company's
voting stock").
14 SeeFRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991) (arguing that voting is valuable because it pressures
managers to "act in [the] shareholders' interest").
15 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating
that "the vote ... is critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by
some ... over vast aggregations of property that they do not own").
11 Compare Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 . Supp. 1545,
1568 (D. Del. 1995) (stating that "retention of the [poison] pill will have no effect on
the success of the proxy contest"), with Randall S. Thomas and KennethJ. Martin, The
Impact of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests: ReevaluatingMoran v. Household International,
14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 327, 336 (1994) (stating that "limits on dissident stock
ownership negatively affect the likelihood of dissident success in a proxy contest").
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the electoral process. Additionally, courts must be willing to take
positive steps to remedy impositions on the franchise by ordering the
reimbursement of expenses, requiring the elimination of antiproxy
measures or demanding the adjustment of corporate defenses.
After years of despairing over the inability of the shareholder to
monitor management, there is finally an opportunity for efficient
oversight.17 As shareholders have begun to utilize the vote to influ-
ence, pressure and ultimately oust management, companies have
attempted to raise barriers to the voting process.18 Unless courts
step in to limit managerial impositions, it is conceivable that the
shareholder franchise will go the way of the unsolicited tender offer.
This Comment will present a critique of the shareholder franchise
case law and recommend a new direction for the courts to take.
Part I of this Comment discusses the reasons why the shareholder
franchise is currently emerging as a potent weapon in the battle for
corporate control. The rise of the institutional investors is discussed,
as well as the changes in the legal environment that have facilitated
the use of the shareholder proxy. Part II enumerates the various
defensive measures that corporations are using to prevent proxy
fights. Part III reviews the relevant case law, beginning with the
unsolicited hostile offer cases that provide a background for
understanding the courts' analysis in the franchise cases. Part IV
presents the arguments for why the shareholder franchise must be
protected. Part V discusses the problems with the current doctrine
and presents alternative solutions.
1 
SeeADOLFA. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 124 (1932) (arguing that "[t] he concentration of economic power
separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered
these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating 'owners' to the
position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise their
power").
18 See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES
at ix (1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES] (listing the different
corporate proxy defenses and showing how they have become more popular over the
past five years).
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I. THE EMERGING POWER OF THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE
A. The Proxy Contest: A History of Irrelevance
For many years, shareholder voting was considered a meaningless
ritual. 9 In a famous early work on the market for corporate
control, a scholar referred to the proxy as "the most expensive, the
most uncertain, and the least used of the various techniques" for
acquiring control of a corporation.20 Others were less kind, calling
the proxy an "anti-democratic device," totally dominated by manage-
ment.2' In response to claims that shareholders were not participat-
ing in corporate government because they were not given enough
information about the firm, the federal government enacted laws to
regulate corporate disclosure and overhaul the proxy machinery.
22
19 See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 n.1 (quoting Professor A.A. Berle as dismissing
"the shareholders' meeting as a 'kind of ancient, meaningless ritual like some of the
ceremonies that go with the mace in the House of Lords'"(citation omitted)). This
Comment will use the terms proxy and vote interchangeably. The proxy is essentially
a contract, granting the right to vote shares of stock. Because corporations typically
have thousands of relatively small shareholders, it is impractical to expect all of them
to appear personally at shareholders' meetings to cast their votes. See MICHAEL D.
WATERS, PROXY REGULATION 9 (1992). Shareholders can also place their own
proposals on the proxy to be voted on as a means of communicating their concerns
to management. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.2-.3, at 371-83
(1986).
The proxy system is authorized under state corporate law and extensively
regulated by federal law. See generally SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 4, at 2-1
(providing a thorough overview of SEC proxy regulation).2o Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 114 (1965).
21 Mortimer M. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair
Corporate Suffrag 39 VA. L. REV. 141, 151 (1953) (stating that "as presently
employed-with the proxy machinery completely dominated by the managers of
industry ... the proxy system of voting has become an anti-democratic device,
destructive of any real system of checks and balances against possible managerial
abuse, and operating in contravention of our fundamental notions of fair play," quoted
in Dozier v. Automobile Club, 244 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)); see also
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17, at 139 (calling the proxy machinery "one of the
principal instruments not by which a stockholder exercises power over the manage-
ment of the enterprise, but by which his power is separated from him").
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994); see also CLARK, supra note 19, § 9.2, at 366 (stating
that the focus of the federal regulation of proxies is to assure "that public investors
have true and adequate information before they exercise their right to vote"); SARGENT
& HONABACH, supra note 4, at 1-3 (stating that "[t]he drafters of Section 14 of the
Securities ExchangeAct of 1934 appeared to contemplate thatpublic disclosure would
... inhibit managerial misbehavior").
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Despite these rules, shareholders still did not take an active role
in corporate management. 2  Only rarely did a proxy fight result in
a change in corporate control.24 For the most part, the proxy was
a tool of activists and gadflies who were more interested in gaining
publicity than actually electing candidates to the board. 25 There is
a cogent explanation for the passivity of the owners of the firm:
because each shareholder owns such a small share of the firm, the
costs of participating in the corporate democracy-reading the proxy
material, becoming informed, voting-exceeds any potential benefit
the shareholder could receive. 26 Thus, shareholder apathy did not
result from a lack of salient information, but was rather a rational
response on the part of the numerous shareholders, each owning an
insignificant amount of a firm.2  This collective action problem also
s See A. Camille Nichols &James B. Swain, Putting Proxies to Work, CORP. BOARD,
May/June 1995, at 11, 11 (stating that until recently, "[t]he possibility that the proxy
vote could or should be used to effect change or send a message to management was
not a major consideration").
24 See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 266
(1981) (stating that "gaining directorships through the processes of corporate
democracy ... is close to impossible"); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State
Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1071, 1084 (1992) (stating that
between 1962 and 1978, there were only 71 proxy contests for control of firms traded
on the New York and American Stock Exchanges, an insignificant figure given the
number of firms that traded on those exchanges); Philip N. Hablutzel & David R.
Selmer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 203, 204
(1988) ("It was said during the 1950s that insurgents were not likely to win such a
[proxy] fight unless dividends had not been paid for several years.").
25 See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 24, at 270-77 (describing the proxy campaigns
directed at U.S. corporations who did business in South Africa or sold infant formula
in the Third World); HENRY C. EGERTON, THE CONFERENCE BD., HANDLING PROTEST
AT ANNUAL MEETINGS 46-55 (1971) (describing social policy proposals included in the
1970 General Motors proxy statement). The vast majority of these proposals were
voted down handily. See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 265 (stating that the Ralph Nader-
led "campaign GM" failed to garner 5% of the vote for its proposals).
28 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 83 (arguing that "[g]iven the
combination of a collective action problem and easy exit through the stock market,
the rational strategy for most dissatisfied shareholders is to sell rather than incur costs
in attempting to bring about change through votes"). The collective action problem
is inherent in all groups who must act together for a common good. See MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 35 (1965) (explaining that as a group gets larger and individual members get
a decreasing percentage of the returns from any expenditure they make, the incentive
for making expenditures for the collective good decreases).
27 See, e.g., John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight 20
J. FIN. ECON. 237, 242 (1988) (explaining that shareholder voting may not pay
because shareholders "tend to hold a very small portion of all outstanding corporate
votes" and that "[tihey thus must rationally recognize that their own voting behavior
is unlikely to affect the outcome of the voting process significantly").
[Vol. 145: 423
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explained the dearth of proxy contests. Shareholders who wished to
challenge management had to expend their own resources to mount
a proxy contest.2" If they lost, they were not reimbursed.29 If they
won, they only received their proportionate share of the gain.
Furthermore, management has a large advantage in a proxy contest
because shareholders are more likely to vote for management than
incur the expense of becoming informed about the opponent.
Historically, the "Wall Street Rule" governed-if you did not like the
way the firm was being managed, sell."0
An additional reason existed for the relative unimportance of
proxy contests-the availability of the tender offer."' As directors
mismanaged the firm and shareholders sold their stock, the price of
a company's shares fell. A "takeover specialist," seeing an opportu-
nity to make a large profit, purchased the depressed shares of the
firm, replaced the inefficient management and brought the company
back to health (or chopped it into pieces). The tender offer
eliminated many of the drawbacks of the proxy fight. Because
shareholders realized immediate gains through a tender offer, the
problem of rational apathy diminished. A large reservoir of
financing developed, so that hostile bidders could pursue even the
I Proxy contests for control can be very expensive. See, e.g., MARK A. SARGENT,
PROXY CONTESTS HANDBOOK Intro.2 (1993) (stating that a "dissident shareholder can
conduct a proxy contest for $1 to $15 million"); Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 1078
(stating that a serious proxy contest will entail expenses for "lawyers, accountants,
financial advisers, printers, and proxy solicitors"); Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal
and Tactical Considerations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of EffectingFundamental
Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 745, 776 (1991) (stating that
during a proxy fight for Lockheed Corp., "the incumbents spent approximately $8
million and the insurgents spent approximately $6 million").
' See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y.
1955) (requiring the corporation to reimburse management for reasonable proxy
expenses but declaring that the corporation had no duty to pay the expenses of the
insurgent group); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1106-17 (1990)
(discussing the current rules regarding proxy reimbursement and suggesting that in
some cases the reimbursement of the proxy expenses of challengers may be an
efficient way to encourage proxy contests for control).
50 See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation
in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 406 & n.163
(1994) (explaining that the "Wall Street Rule holds that shareholders who are
dissatisfied with management can 'vote with their feet'").
"' SeeJohn Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1017 (1993) (stating that "[b]y the late 1960s and
1970s, tender offers had come to dominate the landscape of corporate governance
and control").
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largest corporations.32 The hostile tender offer became the pre-
ferred method of effectuating a change in corporate control.8 3 The
threat of a hostile takeover also helped discipline corporate manage-
ment. A firm whose stock price had become depressed through
mismanagement was a more attractive takeover target.8 4  Thus,
management found it in its self-interest to ensure that the price of
the firm's stock was high and that the shareholders were satisfied. By
the 1980s, the tender offer had assumed the intended role of the
proxy in monitoring management and effectuating corporate change.
B. The End of the Hostile Takeover Era and
the Emergence of the Proxy Contest
1. Corporate Management, with Friends in High Places,
Beats Back the Hostile Raiders
Management responded to the growing number of hostile offers
by putting up defenses. Poison pills (also known as shareholder
rights plans), shark repellants, white knights and other colorfully
named techniques were developed in an attempt to protect corpora-
tions, and their management, from the possibility of being acquired
(and fired)." The legitimacy of these defenses was contested in
the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court.
Although in a few cases the corporate defenses were found to be
invalid, for the most part management was allowed to reject hostile
bids, even if the shareholders were overwhelmingly in favor of the
deal.36 Today, most large firms have poison pills in place, making
32 See SARGENT, supra note 28, at 1.
33 See Pound, supra note 27, at 237 (stating that "[i]n the period 1981-1984, there
were over 250 tender offers for publicly held U.S. corporations, but only about 100
proxy contests, of which fewer than 60 were for control").
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1163 (1984) (explaining that under the Disciplinary Hypothesis of hostile takeovers,
"the role of the tender offer is to replace inefficient management"); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-75 (1981) (arguing that efficiency
demands that management be passive in the face of a tender offer). Corporate
management spent the rest of the decade ignoring this sage advice. See generally
ROSENBAUM, supra note 6, at 13-195 (reviewing the various antitakeover provisions in
the charters and bylaws of the largest firms).
11 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of defenses to hostile takeovers, see
Coffee, supra note 34, at 1221-50.
36 See Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1553,
1564 (D. Del. 1995) (arguing that even though 73.4% of all shareholders tendered
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hostile takeovers prohibitively expensive, if not impossible.37
Delaware courts have recognized the impact of their decisions38
In addition to the corporate takeover defenses, state legislatures
have passed laws to help companies repulse unwanted bids. These
antitakeover laws were passed in response to calls from local
corporations and labor interests. 9 These statutes restrict takeovers
through a number of mechanisms. The "control share" statutes
provide that shareholders who purchase in excess of some threshold
level of a firm's stock must receive approval from the majority of the
shares of the disinterested shareholders before the purchaser is
allowed to vote her shares.40 Delaware has enacted a "business
combination" statute, which places a three-year waiting period on
mergers and takeovers by shareholders with more than 15% of a
company's stock, unless the board or a supermajority of other
shareholders approve.41 A Pennsylvania law requires "short-term
their shares, the company could still refuse to redeem the pill); see also Karen
Donovan, Poison Pills Redux: What Shareholders Don't Know, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 25, 1995,
at BI (quoting a former member of the Delaware high court describing Moore as "the
clearest decision on the right of a company to just say no" to a hostile bid).
37 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at ix (reporting that 799 out
of the 1500 largest firms had poison pills); see also Gabriella Stem, Chrysler Corp. Is
Expected to Be Asked to Loosen Its Antitakeover Defenses, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at A4
(reporting that the trigger point for Chrysler's poison pill is 15%, thereby making
takeovers "prohibitively expensive"); Westinghouse Adopts a Plan Intended to Deter
Takeovers, N.Y. TnmEs, Dec. 30, 1995, at 44 (quoting the company as saying that the
shareholder rights plan was intended "to discourage takeovers that do not provide a
fair value to all shareholders").
58 See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 489-90 (Del. Ch.) (stating that "over
the past decade target company boards have successfully used antitakeover defenses,
particularly the 'poison pill' rights plan, either to defeat unwanted bids or to force the
bidders to raise their price"), affd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
" See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 14, 24-25 (1992) (stating that "politically diverse
coalitions commonly supported antitakeover statutes"); Paul Richter, States Act to Stem
Tide of Takeovers, LA. TIDiES, Sept. 15, 1987, at 1 (reporting how state legislatures have
adopted antitakeover legislation at the behest of large local firms, often with little
debate or opposition).
0 See Hablutzel & Selmer, supra note 24, at 226. The Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act. See CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding that the Indiana Act "does not
conflict with the provisions or purposes of the Williams Act"). As states pass newer
and more severe antitakeover rules, the court challenges continue. See, e.g., WLR
Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1180-82 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the Virginia Control Share Acquisitions Act, Affiliated Transactions Act, Poison Pill
Statute and Business Judgment Statute were not preempted by the Williams Act and
did not violate the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996).
41 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Interim Supp. 1995) (stating that "a
corporation shall not engage in any business combination with any interested
1996]
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shareholders who dispose of their shares within eighteen months
after attempting to acquire control of a firm to disgorge their sales
profits to the firm."42  By mid-1995, forty-one states had adopted
some type of statutory takeover control law.43
To add insult to injury, financing for hostile takeovers is now
hard to come by. These difficulties have resulted from "financial and
regulatory pressures on United States banks and insurance compa-
nies, the virtual collapse of the market for new issues of high-yield
securities, the unavailability of alternative sources of subordinated
financing, ... changes in the tax laws, [and] the heightening of
margin requirements."4 4 According to one scholar, "[t] he takeover
wars are over. Management won."45
2. A New Threat to Management: The Institutional Investor
At the same time that the market for corporate control through
the tender offer was being eliminated, institutional investors emerged
as a force in the world of corporate governance. In 1950, institution-
al investors owned approximately 8% of all equities.4 6  By 1965,
stockholder for a period of three years following the time that such stockholder
became an interested stockholder").42 P.R. Chandy et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth
Generation Anti-Takeover Law, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 399, 412 (1995). A study of stock prices
of Pennsylvania companies before and after the passage of the law found that "the
passage of the Pennsylvania [antitakeover] statute had a substantial negative effect on
the share prices of most Pennsylvania firms." Id. at 403.
4 See From the Hustings: The Roll of States with Takeover Control Laws, MERGERS &
AcQuisrrIoNS, Sept. 19, 1995, available in WL, 1995 WL 10030701 (listing the various
types of statutory takeover defenses and the states that have adopted each). The most
popular defense to hostile takeovers is the "business combination" rule, which freezes
the shares of the acquiror. Thirty-two states, including Delaware, have this rule in
place. Twenty-nine states have nonstockholder "constituency" statutes, which allow
management to take into account the impact of the acquisition on nonshareholders.
Twenty-seven states have control share acquisition rules, while 23 states mandate
poison pills. Seven states have antigreenmail statutes, and five have labor/severance
statutes, which require the acquiror to assume the firm's existing collective bargaining
agreement. Pennsylvania and Ohio mandate the recapture of profits, while only
Massachusetts requires companies to have classified boards. Most of these laws allow
companies to opt out if they choose. For a thorough discussion of state antitakeover
laws, see Andrew R. Brownstein & Mitchell S. Presser, Developments in Takeover Defenses
and Their Impact on Proxy Contests, in PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 1990, at 369, 407-27 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 696, 1990).
11 Warren & Abrams, supra note 13, at 647-48.
'Joseph A. GrundfestJust Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993).
"SeeRock, supra note 4, at 447 (describing the increase in institutional ownership
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almost 16% of all publicly traded shares were controlled by institu-
tions.4' By 1995, that number had risen to 54.2%.48 The holdings
of these institutions are concentrated into a few giant funds. In
1989, the fifty largest institutions collectively owned 27% of all public
U.S. equities.49 The holdings of these institutions are so large that
they can no longer viably follow the "Wall Street Rule" of selling if
they are dissatisfied with corporate performance.50 In recent years
institutional shareholders have begun to assert themselves, using the
power of the vote to challenge boards and, in a number of promi-
nent cases, to unseat them."1 Corporate defenses to hostile take-
of stock).
47 See SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 4, at 1-1.
48 See id.
41 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governane, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLICY 671, 692 (1995). One of the benefits of concentrated ownership is that
the cost of communication decreases. Thus, parties can be made aware of each
other's positions. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383
n.33 (Del. 1995) (stating that the fact "[t]hat institutions held a high percentage of
Unitrin's stock is not as significant as the fact that the relatively concentrated
percentage of stockholdings would facilitate a bidder's ability to communicate the
merits of its position"). See generally DIANA B. HENRIQUES, FIDELITY's WORLD: THE
SECRET LIFE AND PUBLIC POWER OF THE MUTUAL FUND GIANT 36 (1995) (describing
the history behind the world's largest mutual fund).
" See, e.g., Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 197, 227 (1991) (arguing that "large institutional investors... are just too big
to sell out of a company every time they disagree with management"); James M.
Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors-Inside Is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 1707, 1731 (1994) (stating
that selling a large stake in a firm would depress the price of the stock); Kimberly
Blanton, In the Fidelity Fold: An Investment by the Funds Giant Can Be a Mixed Blessing,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1995, at 57 (reporting that Fidelity Investments owns more
than 5% of the shares of 792 publicly traded companies, including 104 Fortune 500
companies). Additionally, many large funds are now indexing. This means that the
fund holds a share of each company in a given index (for example, the S&P 500). As
a result, the fund does not have the ability to sell companies that are underperform-
ing. The only option available is to try to improve the companies' performance.
51 See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Archer-Daniels-Midland Is Drawing Fire from Some
Institutional Holders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at B12 (describing how institutional
investors planned to respond to corporate malfeasance by pressing for bylaw changes,
opposing corporate compensation packages and withholding votes for board
members). In 1992, shareholder pressure led to the ousting of chief executives at
Westinghouse Electric, American Express and IBM Corp. See Angelo B. Henderson
& Gabriella Stern, Chrysler Board Seat Is Nonnegotiable to Avert a Fight, WALL ST. J., Jan.
3, 1996, at B3 (describing how Chrysler's board is conducting a "90-day 'corporate
governance' review," which includes consultation with the company's large institution-
al shareholders);Joann S. Lublin, Despite Poor Returns, Champion's Chairman Hangs on
for 21 Years, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1995, at Al, A8 [hereinafter Lublin, Champion's
Chairman] (explaining how a manager of an underperforming company has managed
narrowly to avoid attempts by institutional investors to replace him); Jennifer
Steinhauer, Pier 1's Loss Only Intensifies Investor Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at DI
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overs have been under attack by institutional shareholders, who
believe that they are nothing but tools to entrench inefficient
managers.52
The California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS")
is the primary example of an institutional investor that has had an
impact on the way corporations are managed." The fund, which
controls $83 billion, monitors the performance of major corporations
and works to make the companies more responsive to shareholder
concerns.54 The sheer size of institutions such as CalPERS elimi-
nates the collective action problem that plagued the small sharehold-
er.55 It is now efficient for these giant investors actively to monitor
companies and take action when a company is being managed
poorly.-
6
Institutional investors have changed the way the proxy machinery
is used. For many years, shareholder initiatives were primarily
related to social policy issues. Today the focus has shifted. Most
proposals now involve corporate governance issues, and unlike the
social policy proposals, receive a great deal of shareholder sup-
(discussing institutional investors' plans to take action against managers who have
been ineffective in controlling the firm's assets); see also Vineeta Anand, '93 Proxy
Season Quiet but Effective, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 31, 1993, at 3, 3.
52 See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Why Dale Hanson Won't Go Away, INSTITUTIONAL
INvESTOR, Apr. 1990, at 79, 84 (reporting that the California Public Employees'
Retirement System ("CalPERS") has filed "a dozen proposals asking for ...
shareholder votes on poison pills and board action to opt out of Delaware's
antitakeover laws, something the state allows"); Rob Norton, Who Owns this Company,
Anyhow, FORTUNE, July 29, 1991, at 131, 138 (describing how large investors are
demanding that takeover defenses be put to a shareholder vote).
5- See Steve Hemmerick, CalPERS Shifts Activism Focus, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 2, 2 (describing how CalPERS is increasing the number of
companies it monitors from 200 to 1200).
14 See Challenge to Boards Is Working, supra note 5, at D3 (describing CalPERS's
request that companies create written guidelines of their board practices).
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1994)
(stating that "[ilt is generally accepted that proxy contests have re-emerged with
renewed significance as a method of acquiring corporate control because 'the growth
in institutional investment has reduced the dispersion of share ownership'" (quoting
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 29, at 1082)).
-6 See, e.g., Black, supra note 3, at 523-24 (explaining how large mutual funds now
own sizable shares of the stock of large companies, eliminating the problem of
rational apathy); Debbie Galant, Putting New Muscle into Proxy Voting, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Feb. 1990, at 161, 161 (reporting that a "new industry of consultants has
sprung up to help [corporate] activists become more effective both in choosing and
waging their battles"); Pound, supra note 31, at 1057 (describing how a number of
leading institutional investors have begun to develop "smart" voting systems, in which
economic and performance factors about the firm are used to determine how
investors should vote on corporate issues).
SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE-NO COMPROMISE
port.5 7 The proxy is now an effective tool for changing or influenc-
ing corporate management.18
Ironically, the fact that shareholders are not able to tender their
shares has enhanced the value of the shareholder proxy. The large
premiums that shareholders received through tender offers are now
a thing of the past. The only way for a shareholder to realize gains
from changes in corporate management is to vote the management
out of office.59
11 See Patrick McGeehan, Social Issues Take Back Seat to Returns, USA TODAY, June
23, 1995, at 3B (reporting that of the record 520 shareholder proposals in 1995, only
108 dealt with social issues, down from over 200 in 1991). The social policy proposals
were supported by an average of 8.3% of voting shareholders. Meanwhile, the
governance issues were supported by an average of more than 40% of voters. See id.
A slightly older survey of institutional voters found a great deal of support for
proposals to prohibit the payment of greenmail, redeem the poison pill, adopt
confidential voting and repeal the classified board. See BERGIN, supra note 1, at 6
(listing different corporate governance proposals and their quantified levels of
support).
1s See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Unlikely Allies Demand Spinoff at RJR Nabisco, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1995, at DI (reporting that two large RJR shareholders, Carl Icahn and
Bennett LeBow, had begun a proxy battle to replace the company's board of directors
and then spin off the Nabisco food unit, with a "substantial dividend" inuring to the
shareholders); Dissident Holders Seek Control of Tesoro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at D2
(reporting that a group of shareholders who owned less than 6% of a company's
shares were initiating a proxy fight to take control of the board of directors); Hartmarx
Holders Support Proposal on 'Poison Pil4' WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1993, at A5 (reporting
that a shareholder proposal calling for the Hartmarx company to dismantle its poison
pill takeover defense received 78% of the shareholder vote). Often, the influence of
institutional investors is such that the issue in dispute never has to reach the level of
a proxy solicitation. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 51, at 3 (reporting that companies
targeted for proxy solicitation agreed to make concessions and avoid the embarrass-
ment of losing a contested fight); James A. White, Shareholder-Rights Movement Sways
a Number of Big Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1991, at Cl (stating that in order "to
avoid disruptive proxy contests during the annual meeting season, 25 companies have
given ground by accepting corporate-governance measures in recent months"); Clark,
supra note 52, at 84 (stating that CaIPERS prefers to resolve issues by meeting with
corporate management rather than through the adversarial process, and citing a
number of behind-the-scenes successes).
11 Hostile bidders are now beginning to couple proxy contests with their tender
offers in an attempt to replace the board and redeem the poison pill. See, e.g.,
Grundfest, supra note 45, at 858 (predicting that "[h]ostile bidders... will likely have
to couple proxy contests with tender offers"); Warren & Abrams, supra note 13, at 650
(noting that the "simultaneous or staged commencement of a tender offer with a
proxy contest or a consent solicitation has emerged in several prominent control
contests"). The courts recognize the phenomenon. See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674
A.2d 483, 490 (Del. Ch.) (explaining that "[r]eplacing the incumbent directors is...
an efficient way to eliminate the target company's ability to utilize these antitakeover
defenses"), aftd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
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3. Rules Now Facilitate Communication and
Coordination Among Investors
The growing influence of the institutional investors has resulted
in changes to the federal proxy rules. Until 1992, SEC regulations
required that anyone who wanted to communicate with more than
ten shareholders in order to influence their votes would be consid-
ered a "soliciting party." Any statements made by a soliciting party
would be subject to prior governmental review, a costly and burden-
some process. ° In 1992, the SEC created new "safe harbor"
exemptions for shareholders who were not soliciting proxies, but
were simply communicating about the management of the corpora-
tion.61 These exemptions allowed shareholders to communicate
about managerial performance and potential activism without first
having to go through expensive and time consuming disclosure
requirements. This rule change has lowered the costs of a potential
proxy contest. Since investors will now have an opportunity to
communicate with large stockholders before commencing their
solicitation, they should be able to gauge better their prospects for
success.
62
Institutional investors are beginning to appreciate and apply the
power of the franchise. 6 For the first time, voting has become a
61 See Michael W. Goroff & Guy W. Winters, Recent Deoeopments in Proxy Contests, in
DOING DEALS: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRAcTIcE
347, 349-50 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-711,
1995) (describing the SEC's pre-1992 regulations).
61 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I(1) (1995). For a discussion of the new shareholder
communication rules see SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 4, at 3-1 to 3-33. See also
Robert S. Frenchman, Comment, The Recent Revisions to Federal Proxy Regulations:
Lifting the Ban on Shareholder Communications, 68 TUL. L. REV. 161, 179 (1993) (stating
that "[t]his reform provides a broad exemption from proxy delivery and disclosure
requirements for unaffiliated shareholders that are not seeking proxy authority").
61 See Andrew E. Bogen, Playing Hardball Under the New Proxy Rules, INSIGHTS, Apr.
1993, at 13, 13; see also Proxy Battles Take on Greater Importance, MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS REP., Apr. 24, 1995, available inWL, 1995 WL 2401937 [hereinafter Proxy Battles]
(stating that the new shareholder communication rules adopted in 1992 "allow suitors
to enlist institutional shareholders in the effort to pressure target managements").
I See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCIA L. REV. 811, 830-45 (1992) (discussing the ability of institutional
investors to monitor management, target poorly performing companies and
strengthen the board of directors); Karl A. Groskaufrnanis, Proxy Reform and the Brave
New World of Investor Relations: Ten Rules of Thumb for the 1990s, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1993,
at 18, 18 (stating that institutional investors helped unseat three of the most powerful
CEOs in the country).
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meaningful tool for monitoring and disciplining corporate manage-
ment.
6 4
II. THE MANAGER STRIKES BACK: LIMITATIONS AND
RESTRICTIONS ON THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE
Management has responded to the threat from the emerging
shareholder franchise just as it had when faced with threats from
hostile tender offers-by attempting to protect itself through a
variety of defensive tactics. The shareholder franchise is regarded as
a weakness in management's otherwise impenetrable defenses. 5
Corporations have begun to take steps to prevent proxy battles. 6
A recent survey by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
("IRRC") found that "[l]arge U.S. corporations are continuing to
bolster their defenses against proxy fights."6 7 The IRRC surveyed
1500 public companies regarding takeover defenses and found that
a large number of firms continue to employ traditional defenses and
" See, e.g., O'Brien & Goudiss, supra note 2, at 7 (declaring that "in an age of
renewed shareholder activism, corporate boards are, from a practical point of view,
increasingly accountable for their stewardship").
' See, e.g., Proxy Battles, supra note 62 (stating that "unsolicited suitors are turning
to proxy contests as a means to fight a recalcitrant target" and that the proxy "often
provides acquirors with substantial ammunition to bring down a target's defenses");
Judith R. Thoyer & Carl L. Reisner, IBM's Recent Threat to Replace Lotus' Board
Demonstrates the Vulnerability of Clients to Voting Contests When They Are Defending Against
Pending Takeovers, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at B6, B6 (stating that "counsel must be
aware of the client's vulnerability to voting contests in a takeover context when
designing takeover defenses").
I See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Management, Shareholders and Stakeholders, 36 ST. Louis U. LJ. 519,
613 (1992) (stating that "[iln much the same way corporations adopted antitakeover
measures to prevent transactions threatening to usurp management's power, so too
can management undermine the power of institutional shareholders by diluting or
restricting their voting power"); Chase Amends Bylaws to Fortify Defenses Against Takeovers,
ASIAN WALL ST.J., May 22, 1995, available inWL, 1995 WL-WSJA 8773842 [hereinafter
Chase Amends Bylaws] (reporting that Chase Manhattan Corp. amended its corporate
bylaws by taking away the right of holders with more than 25% of the firm's stock to
call special meetings and enacted an advance notice requirement in order to
"strengthen its hand against a possible proxy contest"); Ind6pendence Requires Diverse
Measures Beyond the Poison Pill, CFO ALERT, Oct. 30, 1995, available in WL, 1995 WL
2540952 (citing supermajority voting requirements, elimination of special meetings
and shareholder consents, and staggered boards as some of the tactics management
can use to prevent a change in control).
67 VineetaAnand, New Proxy Defenses Gain Popularity, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct.
80, 1995, at 9, 9; see also Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 280
(Del. Ch. 1989) (enumerating Polaroid's defenses to stockholder actions, including
prohibiting action by written consent, restricting the use of special meetings, and
requiring advance written notice for nominating directors).
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to* develop new tactics to defeat proxy fights and other forms of
shareholder activism." The following is a survey of the main
corporate defenses against proxy fights and other shareholder
attempts to challenge the supremacy of a company's board.
Classified (Staggered) Boards-A classified board is one in which
directors are divided into separate classes (normally three) with each
class elected to different, overlapping terms.69 In any given year,
only one-third of the board seats are available. As a result, an
opponent will need more than one election to take control of the
board. This may act to deter proxy fights, and it gives management
time to respond to threats to its control.7" In a number of recent
cases, insurgents have swept an election, only to find themselves an
outvoted minority on the board of directors.n State statutes
generally permit the classification of directors 2.7  According to the
IRRO survey, 60% of firms had classified boards in 1995, up from
57% in 1990.
71
Event Risk Contracts--These are contractual devices that create special
rights for bondholders or preferred shareholders if a change in
control takes place. An event risk contract is similar to a flip-in
shareholder rights plan, but rather than punishing an outsider
I See Anand, supra note 67, at 9. The study is called CORPORATE TAKEOVER
DEFENSES, supra note 18. The IRRC performed similar studies in 1990 and 1993.
69 See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (1984) ("If there are nine or more
directors, the articles of incorporation may provide for staggering their terms by
dividing the total number of directors into two or three groups, with each group
containing one-half or one-third of the total, as near as may be." (emphasis omitted)).
70 See ROSENBAUM, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing the effects of classifying a board).
"' See, e.g., James P. Miller & Larry M. Greenberg, Wallace Computer Holders Elect
Directors Backed by Moore Corp., WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1995, at B3 (stating that even
though nominees of Wallace Computer Service's hostile suitors won a proxy contest,
their victory "won't yield a majority position on the eight-member board" because only
three seats were up for election).
72 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1991) (stating that directors "may... be
divided into one, two or three classes"). In fact, Massachusetts mandates staggered
boards as a default rule as part of its antitakeover legislation. See MASS. ANN. LAWs ch.
156B, § 50A(a) (1996).
73 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at ix. Institutional investors
have acted to oppose classified boards. See BERGIN, supra note 1, at 22 ("Support for
classified boards is almost non-existent among public pension funds... ."). In 1994,
a proposal to declassify the board of U.S. Shoe Corp. passed with 82% of the vote, and
a proposal to declassify the board at Kmart Corp. won with 60.5% of the vote. See
Thoyer & Reisner, supra note 65, at B6 (citing instances when shareholder proposals
to declassify a board have been accepted).
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attempting to take control, it punishes the common shareholders
who voted the managers out. In the event of a change in control,
new stock is issued to preferred shareholders, or bondholders are
allowed to sell at a premium, supposedly in order to protect their
rights under a new regime.74 These restrictions act as disincentives
to shareholder voting, since the value of common shares will
decrease when the new rights are triggered.
Poison Pills-Although shareholder rights plans were initially
developed to oppose unsolicited tender offers,7' they can be an
effective means of interfering with the shareholder franchise as well.
A rights plan limits the number of shares that a single party "can
accumulate before launching a proxy contest."76 The most common
trigger is now 20%, but "some plans go as low as 10%."77 Rights
plans can also stop a dissident from forming coalitions with other
shareholders if collectively they would own a greater percentage of
voting stock than the trigger level7 8 Some rights plans are written
to prevent dissident groups from making informal agreements with
one another.79  Today 53% of surveyed firms have shareholder
rights plans, up from 50% in 1990.80
Advance Notice Requirements---Advance notice provisions serve to
eliminate the element of surprise employed by challengers, giving
management advance notice of challengers' plans.81 These bylaws,
4 See Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the
Shareholders' Franchise Righ4 44 STAN. L. REV. 129, 170-72 (1991) (describing Time
Warner's common stock dilution mechanism and other event risk arrangements that
benefit bondholders).
715 See Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: Wen
Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 512 (1993) (describing the history
of the use of shareholder rights plans).76Id.
7 Id.; see also Stem, supra note 37, at A4 (reporting that Chrysler's poison pill is
now set to trigger at 15% ownership, although earlier it had been as low as 10%).
78 See Warren & Abrams, supra note 13, at 663 (1992) ("Most rights plans provide
in broad terms that one stockholder will be deemed to be the 'beneficial owner' of
another stockholder's shares if the stockholders have any 'agreement, arrangement
or understanding' regarding the voting of their stock.").
7 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A.11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl 17) (holding that a rights plan which would be triggered if
a shareholder made informal voting agreements with other shareholders was not a
material interference with that shareholder's ability to engage in a proxy contest).
80 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at ix.
81 See, e.g., American Gen. Corp. v. Torchmark, No. CIV.A.H-90-1068, 1990 WL
595282, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 1990) (refusing to enjoin the use of a 60-day
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which "require notice of nominees or matters to be presented by
stockholders at annual or special meetings,"82 impede potential
opponents and give management more time to respond to a
challenge. Advance notice requirements are a very recent phenome-
non. As late as 1990, very few companies had them. In 1995, the
IRRC found that 43.8% of survey companies had restrictions of this
kind.8
Elimination of Cumulative Voting-Cumulative voting permits share-
holders to distribute the number of votes they are entitled to cast
among several candidates.8 4 This process allows a minority of
shareholders to gain a board representative. Directors do not like
cumulative voting since it allows for dissenting voices on the board.
The percentage of surveyed firms that allow cumulative voting has
decreased from 15.7% to 14.4% over the past five years.85
Elimination of Shareholders' Ability to Call a Special Meeting-Many state
corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting,
unless that right is limited in the company's bylaws. Other states,
such as Delaware, do not allow shareholders to call such a meeting
unless the right is specified in the bylaws.8 6 The ability to call a
special meeting is advantageous to shareholders, since it allows them
to change a company's control without having to wait for its annual
meeting. Thirty-one percent of surveyed firms now specifically limit
shareholders' rights to call special meetings, up from 24% in 1990.7
Elimination of Shareholders' Ability to Take Action by Written Consent-
Closely related to the right to call a special meeting is the right to act
through consents. Shareholder consents are very powerful tools for
an insurgent because action is taken against incumbent directors
immediately upon delivery of the consents; there is no need for a
advance notice provision that was not adopted in response to a proxy contest).
82 Thoyer & Reisner, supra note 65, at B8.
8 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at viii; see also Chase Amends
Bylaws, supra note 66 (reporting that Chase Manhattan Corp. amended its corporate
bylaws by enacting an advance notice requirement in order to "strengthen its hand
against a possible proxy contest").
84 See BERGIN, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining cumulative voting).
85 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at viii.
8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (d) (1991) ("Special meetings of the stockhold-
ers may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be
authorized by certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.").
87 See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at viii.
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meeting.8" Since action can be taken at any time, management will
not be able to respond to the threat until it is too late.89 Most state
corporation laws limit this right by requiring unanimity to take action
through a consent.9 0 Delaware and a number of other states allow
non-unanimous consent solicitations.91 Many statutes, however,
allow the corporation to opt out of the consent practice through an
amendment or through a restriction in the certificate. In the last
several years, companies have begun to change their charters to
eliminate shareholder consent rights.92  Thirty-one percent of
surveyed firms limit these rights, up from 24% in 1990."
Supermajority VotingRequirements-Supermajority voting was originally
formulated as an antitakeover device. By requiring a greater
percentage of stockholders to approve a proposed action, stockhold-
ers are given more power to defeat actions adverse to their interests.
Supermajority provisions can be used in combination with other
defenses such as the staggered board to entrench management.
9 4
I See Thoyer & Reisner, supra note 65, at B6 (stating that failing to opt out of a
consent solicitation rule "can leave a target with severely limited flexibility once a
takeover bid has begun"); see also Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 419
(Del. 1988) ("When [tide 8, § 228 of the Delaware Code], authorizing majority
stockholder consent in lieu of a meeting, was added to the General Corporation Law
in 1967, its broad use in takeover battles, which we now observe, was not contemplat-
ed." (footnote omitted)).
89 See Thoyer & Reisner, supra note 65, at B8 ("Once a bidder's access to the voting
machinery through the consent solicitation process and the process of calling a special
meeting of stockholders has been thwarted, a corporation has gone a long way toward
limiting the opportunity for a bidder to apply pressure through the ballot box.").
91 See id. at B6, B8 n.8 (noting unanimity requirements).
91 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 603 (1990) (stating that "any action which may be
taken at any annual or special meeting of shareholders may be taken without a
meeting and without prior notice, if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so
taken, shall be signed by the holders of outstanding shares having not less than the
minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action
at a meeting at which all shares entitied to votes thereon were present and voted");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (1991) (stating that "any action which may be taken
at any annual or special meeting of such stockholders, may be taken without a
meeting, without prior notice and without a vote"). Delaware, however, does make
a consent solicitation more difficult to win than a vote in a shareholder meeting. To
succeed in a consent solicitation, a party needs an absolute majority of all the
outstanding shares, not simply a majority of the voted shares. Thus, abstaining from
a consent is "de facto voting against the proponent." Thoyer & Reisner, supra note
65, at B6.
92 See BERGIN, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that 130 of the Fortune 500 companies
have changed their charters and bylaws to limit these rights).
s See CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 18, at viii.
9 See, e.g., Miller & Greenberg, supra note 71, at B3 (reporting that the Moore
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Supermajority voting provisions give minority shareholders the power
to veto the will of the majority, effectively disenfranchising the
majority. 5
Dilution of Ownership Through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP")-An ESOP places shares of the company under the employ-
ees' control. This is an effective tactic to oppose a proxy fight since
employees, concerned with job preservation, are usually fearful of
control changes.9 6  Additionally, "[mlanagement generally acts as
a trustee of the firm's pension fund and of the firm's ownership
plan, and hence it can significantly influence how the firm's shares
held by the ... stock ownership plan are voted."97
Manipulation of the Size of the Board-Under the laws of almost every
state, the directors have the power to fix the size of the board and to
appoint new directors to fill vacancies, unless the bylaws or charter
declares otherwise.98 Directors can manipulate the size of the board
to defend against a proxy fight. In a "musical chairs" defense,
corporations can eliminate seats occupied by opponents or reduce
the size of the board to foil a cumulative voting system.9 9 Managers
Corp. failed in its attempt to overcome a supermajority requirement to remove the
directors who were not up for election, and thus only came away from the election
with three of the eight seats on the board).
" See Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927-28 (Del.
1990) (holding that the shareholders "evidenced an intent" to "thwart attempts to
seize control" of the corporation when they adopted an 80% supermajority
requirement for changing the corporate bylaws).
9 See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. AT&T, 761 F. Supp. 475, 482 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding
that "[t]he size of the ESOP was not related to benefits objectives but, rather, was an
attempt to place as large a number of shares into friendly hands as possible" (footnote
omitted)); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. Ch.
1989) (stating that an ESOP gives the managers "a leg up in opposing a takeover
bid").917 Ren6 M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the
Market for Corporate Control, 20J. FIN. ECON. 25, 48 (1988).
98 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1991) ("The number of directors shall be
fixed by, or in the manner provided in, the bylaws."); id. § 142(e) ("Any vacancy
occurring in any office of the corporation by death, resignation, removal or otherwise,
shall be filled as the bylaws provide. In the absence of such provision, the vacancy
shall be filled by the board of directors or other governing body."); id. § 223(a) (1)
("Vacancies and newly created directorships resulting from any increase in the
authorized number of directors elected by all of the stockholders... may be filled by
a majority of the directors then in office.").
" See, e.g., Klein, supra note 74, at 145-46 (stating that "Sears eliminated five inside
director seats in a defensive move after Robert Monks, a shareholder rights activist,
announced his intent to solicit proxies for election to the board" (footnote omitted)).
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can also increase the size of the board and appoint allies to those
seats in order to maintain a majority.
Moving the Date of the Election-When faced with a proxy fight, boards
have frequently attempted to use their power to set the record
date' 0 and election date to harass, delay or otherwise impede their
opponents. 10' In one case, a board moved the date of an election
forward in order to deny its opponents time to gather enough
proxies to win the election. 02 When faced with a potential election
defeat, boards also may cancel or otherwise delay the election.' °
ContinuingDirectorProvisions-These rules guarantee that only current
directors of the firm or their handpicked successors can perform
104 Thsicertain acts. This is one of the strongest possible defenses
because even if the proxy fight succeeds, the new managers will be
left with a hollow victory as they will be limited in their available
actions.5' The IRRC Survey does not list companies with a
continuing director defense, most likely because it is so rare at this
time.
100 The record date "functions in much the same way as voter registration require-
ments for elections in our political system." JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERULS ON CORPORATIONS 579-80 (3d ed. 1989).
101 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (1991) (stating that "the board of directors
may fix a record date... [which] shall not be more than 60 nor less than 10 days
before the date of such meeting").
102 SeeSchnellv. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437,43940 (Del. 1971) (holding that
the directors had acted inequitably and that the original meeting date should be
reinstated).
10 See, e.g., Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(finding that the directors delayed the board meeting scheduled for the next day
because they were informed that they might lose the election).
104 See, e.g., Sutton Holding Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., No. CIV.A.12051, 1991 WL
80223, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1991). In Sutton, the board instituted a "change in
control" provision in its employee pension plans. According to this provision, if any
person became the beneficial owner of 35% of the company's stock without the
approval of a majority of the "continuing directors" or without prior approval of two-
thirds of the board, the funds in the pension plan would be frozen for five years. See
id. Because the excess funding in the pension plan constituted a large part of the
value of the firm, inability to reach the funds would effectively deter any potential
acquiror. Id. at *2-3.
105 See, e.g., Steven Lipin,J&J Goes to Court to Disarm Cordis of an Unusual 'Pill, 'WALL
ST.J., Oct. 27, 1995, at B2 (stating that the Cordis Corp.'s shareholder rights plan can
only be disengaged by "existing directors or their handpicked successors"). This type
of arrangement is known as the "dead-hand" defense since it allows people who are
no longer directors "to rule from the grave." Id. (citation omitted).
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The corporate law of most states allows almost any voting prac-
tice. ' 6 "The Delaware General Corporation Law affords consider-
able flexibility in the construction of mechanisms for corporate
governance and control." ' This flexibility is allowed so that
corporations can tailor their laws to best respond to changing
circumstances. Ironically, this same flexibility can also lead to abuse.
The idea that the very rules that give shareholders the power to elect
directors are being used by those directors to entrench themselves
raises serious questions about who actually is in control of this
country's corporations.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES TO THE
SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE
A. The Takeover Defense Line of Cases-A Blueprint for the
Future of the Franchise?
The Delaware courts are still formulating their response to
management tactics that implicate the shareholder franchise.
08
These cases are particularly difficult for the courts because they
involve a number of conflicting policies and philosophies.
The first and most fundamental idea is that management runs
the corporation, not the shareholders,"0 9 and certainly not judg-
es. °10 When management has a conflict of interest or divided
'0 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 63-65 (describing the variety of
voting possibilities available under state statutes).
11 Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927 (Del.
1990); see also Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977)
(holding that a voting scheme that limited shareholder voting based on the number
of shares owned was valid as it did not conflict with the Delaware corporation laws).
108 SeeWNH Invs. v. Batzel, No. CIV.A.13931, 1995 WL 262248, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr.
28, 1995) (stating that "[tjhe courts are now in the process of harmonizing the cases
and refining the rules" regarding franchise interference).
109 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. CIVA.10866,
CIV.A.10670, CIV.10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14) (stating that
"[t]he corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising
their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of
the shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage
the firm"), afftd, 565 A.2d 280, 281 (Del. 1989); see alsoDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1991) (stating that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors").
"o See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(Del. 1989) (stating that "in our view, precepts underlying the businessjudgment rule
militate against a court's engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and
evaluate the relative merits of a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for
shareholders"); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding
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loyalties, however, courts will frequently review the fairness of a
board's actions."' There are a number of areas in corporate law
where managerial action straddles this line, exhibiting attributes of
both a "business judgment" transaction and a "self-interested" one.
The most prominent examples of these cases are the takeover-
defense cases. When a director rejects a hostile offer, she may
honestly believe that the offer is an inferior one which is not in the
corporation's best interest. On the other hand, it is also possible
that the rejection is predicated on the manager's desire to retain her
comfortable position and large paycheck. The Delaware courts have
struggled greatly with these cases.
Initially the supreme court established a "reasonableness"
standard for management actions aimed at preventing a takeover of
the firm."2 This was a very liberal standard, since any change in
control could potentially present a "danger" to corporate policy.
This standard stood for twenty years, until 1985, when the court
attempted to strengthen it by adding a second prong to the test: not
only did the defensive measure need to be in response to a reason-
ably perceived threat, but it also had to be "reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."" 3
As time passed, the court realized that in deciding what was not
a reasonable response to a threat, the court was "substituting its
judgment ... for that of a corporation's board of directors."" 4
Rather than usurp the power of the directors, the court began to
defer to managerial assessments of danger."5 Not surprisingly,
that "[a] board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and
its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what
is or is not sound business judgment").
... See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that
there is "no 'safe harbor' for such divided loyalties in Delaware"); Loft, Inc. v. Guth,
2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938) (stating that "the directors of a corporation stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders").
"2 See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964) (stating that the directors
only had to show "reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed .... [D]irectors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation").
"I Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (finding
that a selective exchange offer was a reasonable response to a "two-tier coercive tender
offer coupled with the threat of greenmail"). For a narrative of the battle for Unocal,
see ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. ET AL., BOARD GAMES: THE CHANGING SHAPE OF
CORPORATE POWER 91-111 (1988).
114 Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-53.
115 See id. at 1153.
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management saw danger in a wide variety of situations. One threat
to a corporation was that its shareholders, "in ignorance or a
mistaken belief," might tender their shares in response to an offer
that, although much higher than the market price, was below what
the directors believed the firm to be worth." 6 The court agreed
that this premium offer could be seen as a threat to the firm, stating
that "[d] irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit.""
7
The Delaware Supreme Court's most recent appraisal of a
director's duty in the face of a hostile offer has, for all practical
purposes, returned the court to the original 1964 reasonableness test.
The court stated that as long as a defensive measure is not "preclu-
sive or coercive,""' it is allowable if it is "within the range of
reasonable defensive measures available to the Board."" 9 A federal
district court in Delaware recently applied this new standard and
found that a tender offer "pose [d] a threat that shareholders might
tender their shares without appreciating the fact that after substantial
capital investment, [the corporation] is actually witnessing the
beginning of the pay-off of its business strategy."12°
B. The Question of Legitimacy in Corporate Law
1. A Promising Beginning
It is now apparent that the courts will allow management to take
almost any action to protect the corporation from a hostile tender
offer. 2 ' Courts have been more restrictive, however, regarding
managerial interference with the shareholder franchise. As a
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1154. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Time has been much
criticized. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 66, at 574 (stating that the "weakness of Time
is its failure to perform more than a cursory review of the reasonableness of the
board's response to the threat from Paramount's bid").
18 See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114
(Del. Ch. 1986) (finding that a management self-tender in response to a hostile offer
was coercive because a "stockholder, acting with economic rationality, has no effective
choice as between the contending offers as presently constituted").
19 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (noting
that this decision was in accord with the holding in Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del.
1964), an indication that the court had come full circle).
120 Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 R Supp. 1545, 1560 (D.
Del. 1995).
121 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 45, at 936 (stating that "[h]ostile contests for
corporate control no longer threaten incumbent managers").
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practical matter, it is difficult to see why. A proxy fight poses all the
same threats as a tender offer. The management of the corporation
is being faced with a challenge to its control: in a tender offer the
insurgent is asking shareholders to sell her their share of the firm so
that she can run it, while in a proxy fight, the insurgent is simply
asking the shareholder to elect her to run the firm. In both cases
management can reasonably believe that the change will be for the
worse.
Sometimes the line is even blurrier-hostile bidders can join a
tender offer with a proxy fight, so that the net result is truly
identical. In other cases there is no tender offer, but an assurance
by the challenger that, once elected, the challenger will remove
defensive measures and the firm will be sold, either as a whole or in
pieces. In such situations, management can reasonably fear that
harm will come to the firm. Thus, it makes sense to allow managers
to have the ability to repulse the threat from a proxy contest, as they
can a threat from an unsolicited tender offer.
Proxy fights also implicate another set of principles. The idea
that management should not interfere with or usurp the shareholder
franchise has been well recognized in American law for over 150
years.'22 Schemes in which directors voted the corporation's own
stock according to their own self-interest were struck down as
"entrusting to persons in power the means of keeping themselves in
power."2 ' The modem formulation of these laws was pronounced
in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, a case in which management tried
to advance a scheduled election date to gain an advantage in a proxy
contest.1 24  The supreme court found that management had
" See, e.g., Lennane v. ASK Computer Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A.11744, 1990 WL
154150, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1990) (stating that "[f]or more than 150 years courts
have been careful to guard against attempts by directors to use their control over
corporate property or corporate processes to assure their perpetuation in office").
" Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1009 (Del. Ch. 1987) (citing Allen v. De
Lagerberger, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 341 (1888)). In Speiser, the court reviewed a
number of 19th century cases in which courts struck down structures that "deprive [d]
the true owners of the corporate enterprise of a portion of their voice in choosing
who shall serve as directors." Id.; see also Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426, 435 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1826) (stating that "[it is not to be tolerated that a Company should procure
stock... which its officers may wield to the purposes of an election; thus securing
themselves against the possibility of removal").
124 See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding that
management acted inequitably in moving the election date forward); see also Coalition
to Advocate Pub. Util. Responsibility, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202, 1206-07 (D.
Minn. 1973) (holding that when management classified the board of directors and
eliminated cumulative voting rights before a contested election, there may have been
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"attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware Law
for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office" and that although its
action violated no law, "inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible." 1"5 Delaware courts
have also struck down attempts by directors to issue "'shares to
accomplish an improper purpose, such as to enable a particular
person or group to maintain or obtain voting control."'" 26
The strongest argument in this area was made in the case of
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.27 An insurgent group, Blasius,
organized a consent solicitation to increase the size of the board
from seven to fifteen members, the maximum size allowed in the
charter, and nominated eight individuals to fill the new seats.12
Management responded by adding two new directors to the board,
thus foreclosing the possibility of the insurgents gaining control of
the board through the consent process.
129
The chancery court found that this step was taken "in order to
impede or preclude a majority of the shareholders from effectively
adopting the course proposed by [the challengers]."' Notably,
the court found that the board had not acted in bad faith, but rather
was responding to a "threat" from a takeover group that was propos-
ing a radical, and potentially harmful, recapitalization of the compa-
ny.131  Under a Unocal analysis, management likely would have
prevailed-there was a reasonably perceived threat to the corporation
and a proportionate response.132 The threat in Blasius, however,
a breach of fiduciary duty).
12 Schnell 285 A.2d at 439. The court focused on the fact that the management's
purpose was inequitable, leaving open the question of whether such a move might be
permissible if it were not meant to "obstruct[) the legitimate efforts of dissident
stockholders." Id.
126 Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967)
(quoting Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Del. Oh. 1941)).
'2 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). A number of articles have been written about
the decision in Blasius. See generally DennisJ. Block et al., ChancellorAllen, the Business
Judgment Rule, and the Shareholders' Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 785, 831-41
(1992); Andrew C. Houston, Blasius and the Democratic Paradigm in Corporate Law, 17
DEL. J. CORP. L. 843 (1992); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen 'sJurisprudence and the
Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 733-45 (1992); Gregory S. Schaer,
Comment, Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.: Closer Scrutiny of Board Decisions Under
the "Compelling Justification" Standard, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 639 (1991).
' See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 654.
1 See id. at 655.
"0 Id. at 656.
"3 See id. at 658. Had the court found that the board members did not act in good
faith, but rather to entrench themselves, the board would have violated its duty of
loyalty. See id.
112 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) ("If a
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was not a hostile offer, but a shareholder vote that management
believed might harm the firm. The court asked whether the same
Unocal analysis should be applied in the face of a "threat" from a
corporate election. 3 In the strongest possible language, the court
said no:
The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests....
... [The vote] is critical to the theory that legitimates the
exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
aggregations of property that they do not own.
... The theory of our corporation law confers power upon
directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not create
Platonic masters."M
The court declared that attempts to interfere with the sharehold-
er franchise raise fundamental questions regarding the allocation of
power between managers and shareholders which are not covered by
the standard business judgment rule.' Therefore, this was not "a
question that a court may leave to [an] agent finally to decide so
long as he does so honestly and competently." '6
Rather than declare that actions taken for the primary purpose
of interfering with the franchise were automatically void, the court
left open the possibility that "some set of facts would justify such
extreme action."3 7 The court concluded that there would have to
defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the businessjudgment rule, it must
be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.").
" SeeBlasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (asking
whether the Unocal rule applies to action designed to interfere with the effectiveness
of a stockholder vote).
'3 Id. at 659, 663. This last statement has been criticized as lacking a factual basis.
See, e.g., Houston, supra note 127, at 849 (stating that "Blasius cites neither legislative
history nor case law to explain what the theory in question is or to confirm the
assertion that it is the theory referred to that underlies the voting provisions of
Delaware corporate law"). But see Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health Care,
Inc., No. CIV.A13135, 1993 WL 432779, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993) (explaining
that protecting shareholder franchise is vital to the preservation of the corporate form
in that it gives the "assurance of fair treatment" to shareholders who entrust their
assets to managers without an enforceable right to a return).
'15 See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 662. In a hypothetical, the court described a scenario in which a
corporation acted to dilute the holdings of a majority shareholder who intended to
cash out the minority shareholder at a low price. While declining to "hazard an
opinion on that abstraction," the court noted that such facts were "close enough" to
demonstrate the "utility of a rule that permits, in some extreme circumstances, an
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be a "compelling justification" for such a move.1 8 The question of
what constitutes a "compelling justification" for interference with the
shareholder franchise has yet to be determined. In Blasius, there
were valid reasons for the board to believe that a change in control
would not be in the best interests of the firm. Even the Chancellor
who decided the case believed that the proposal made by the
insurgent group was flawed. Despite management's legitimate
concern about the wisdom of the insurgent's plans, the Chancellor
declared that shareholders "could view the matter differently than
... the board," and that they should be entitled to express their
views through the corporate franchise."3 9
2. Blasius and Interco-A Common Starting Point,
a Common Ending?
The language in Blasius was strong and precise in its defense of
the shareholder franchise. But some of this language was repeated
in a case decided by the chancery court three months later involving
a tender offer rather than a proxy contest.14 ° In Interco, the court
held that a firm would have to repeal its poison pill in the face of an
all-cash, all-shares offer at a fair price, since "reasonable minds not
affected by an inherent, entrenched interest in the matter, could not
reasonably differ with respect to the conclusion" that the tender offer
did not constitute a threat to the corporation."4 The language is
very similar to that in Blasius-the shareholder should have the right
ultimately to decide the fate of the corporation. Much of the analysis
is similar as well:
Our corporation law exists, not as an isolated body of rules and
principles, but rather in a historical setting and as a part of a larger
body of law premised upon shared values. To acknowledge that
directors may employ the recent innovation of "poison pills" to
deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a
noncoercive offer.., would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with
widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as to
incumbent board to act in good faith for the purpose of interfering with the outcome
of a contemplated vote." Id. at 662 n.5.
'-8 Id. at 661.
139 Id. at 663.
"0 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), rejected by
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
141 Id. at 799.
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The concern for the legitimacy of corporation law was the
premise of both Blasius and Interco.141 While not formally over-
turned, the holding in Interco has been repudiated. The Supreme
Court of Delaware declared that a court has no business substituting
its own judgment for that of a corporation's board of directors. The
court stated that " [t]o the extent that the Court of Chancery has
recently done so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such
approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis."' The
court specifically cited Interco and its progeny as cases to be rejected.
The court declared that the demands of the shareholders must
be subordinated to the strategic decisionmaking power of the
board.' The court rejected the call for protecting the "legitimacy
... of our corporation law" as defined in Interco,' dismissing it as
judicial interference in the management of a corporation.
4 7
Would the similar dicta in Blasius be treated similarly? In a number
of cases, the court has said no. The court has acknowledged that
there is something different about the shareholder franchise,
something that needs to be protected. But both the chancery court
and supreme court have struggled to identify just how and when to
defend the election process. The case law reflects a haphazard
attempt to balance the competing goals of protecting the vote and
respecting managerial power to exercise judgment when responding
to threats to the firm.
'41 Id. at 799-800.
4 One commentator has suggested that the court's concern for legitimacy in the
law was significant because the "legitimacy of Delaware corporate law has been
vigorously questioned" by scholars who claim that Delaware, in order to attract
corporations, "subordinate [s] concerns of legitimacy." Massey, supra note 127, at 689.
'"Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
' See id. at 1150 (stating that directors have a broad mandate to "set a corporate
course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability").
14 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 800 (Del. Ch. 1988), rejected
by Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
147 Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
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C. The Confused Case Law
1. Election Delay Cases-Purposeful Interference with the Franchise
Under most state corporation laws, the power to decide the time
and place of the annual meeting is delegated by the corporate
bylaws.' These bylaws usually give directors the right to set a
record date, call a meeting, or cancel a meeting. In a number of
cases, managers have used their power to control the time of a
meeting to manipulate the election process for their own benefit. In
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., a board of directors, upon hearing from
a consultant that they might lose an election to be held at the
shareholders' meeting scheduled for the next day, decided to
postpone the meeting for five months.49 According to Delaware
law, there was no requirement that the meeting be held until the
later date. 50 The directors argued that the postponement was
necessary to inform the shareholders about the company's plans.
The chancery court rejected this idea, reasoning that, since the
company's stock was heavily owned by institutional investors and
arbitrageurs, it could be assumed that the shareholders were already
well informed.' Additionally, because the shareholder proxies
would expire before the new record date, the delay would be costly
to the plaintiffs. Thus, the court declared that the meeting had to
be held as soon as possible to protect the insurgent's record
date.
152
148 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991) (designating time and place for
meetings of stockholders); id. § 218(a) (fixing the record date for voting); id. § 222
(providing notice of meetings).
149 See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1987).
150 SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991) (declaring that"[a]n annual meeting
of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time
designated by or in the manner provided in the bylaws"). The last HBO annual
meeting had been held the previous September. See Aprahamian, 531 A.2d at 1206.
15 See Aprahamian, 531 A.2d at 1207. The court also mentioned that the price of
the stock was over $23 per share when the current CEO sold 500,000 of his own
shares. At the time of the trial, the share price was $8.50. See id. at 1206. Perhaps
the court believed that no amount of information would change the shareholders'
minds about management.
152 See id. at 1208; see also Gintel v. XTRA Corp., C.A. No. 11422 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27,
1990) (unpublished decision) (holding that the postponement of an election two days
in advance of the meeting was invalid). But see MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., Nlo. CIV.A.10868, 1989 WL 63900, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 13, 1989)
(holding that a company could postpone its meeting for a month-and-a-half in the
face of a proxy fight and a coercive two-tier front-loaded tender offer).
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Three years later, the chancery court decided a similar case, Stahl
v. Apple Bancorp ("Stahl F). Stahl, a 30% shareholder in Apple
Bancorp, declared his intent to replace the board at the next annual
meeting. 5 ' The shareholder's goal was to install his own directors,
redeem the poison pill, and then make a tender offer for all
outstanding shares of common stock of the company.' On April
9, the company's proxy solicitor told the board that if it did not
present the stockholders with an economic alternative to Stahl's
offer, Stahl would easily prevail in the election. In response, the
board withdrew the April 17 record date and did not set a new
one. 5 The court decided the case on very narrow and formalistic
grounds, stating that, because the meeting had not been formally
called, the shareholder franchise was not impaired at all. 5 ' As a
result, the defensive move was evaluated under the proportionality
standard set forth in Unocal and found to be a justifiable response to
the threat posed by Stahl's tender offer. 57 The court contrasted
this situation with that in Aprahamian, where the meeting was called
and then cancelled."5 ' The Stahl I decision has been criticized for
its abandonment of the Blasius ideal. 59 The court, however, was
careful to explain that the mere "prospect that the shareholders
might vote differently than the board recommends can [not] alone
constitute any threat to the corporate interest."
160
The chancery court's most recent, and most confused, "election
delay" decision is Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore.161 In Kidsco, a proxy fight
was joined with a hostile tender offer.162 The target in this case was
" See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl)).
'54 See id. at 1119.
" The meeting must be held within 60 days of the record date. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (1991) (stating that "the board of directors may fix a record date
... [that is not] more than 60 nor less than 10 days before the date of such
meeting").
Im See Stahl I, 579 A.2d at 1123 (calling the formal setting of a meeting date "an
act of some dignity and significance"); see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., Nos. CIVA..10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *26 (Del. Ch.July 14)
(stating that Blasius did not apply to a case where the defendant corporation did not
allow shareholders to vote on a proposed merger because "Delaware law create[s] no
right in these circumstances to vote"), affd, 565 A.2d 280, 281 (Del. 1989).
.7 See Stahl I, 579 A.2d at 1124.
I's See id. at 1123.
" See Massey, supra note 127, at 739-43 (arguing that Stahllwas overly formalistic,
and may have been influenced by the supreme court's rejection of the Interco logic in
Time).
160 Stahl I, 579 A.2d at 1124.
' 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch.), affd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
'6 Id. at 496 (holding that a last minute bylaw change that delayed a special
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The Learning Company ("TLC"), a software firm which was to be
acquired by Broderbund, a larger firm in the same industry. The
shareholder meeting in which the deal was to be voted on was
scheduled for December 11, 1995.163 Before that time, however,
Kidsco, 16 a third firm, made a competing tender offer, and called
for a special meeting. At this meeting, Kidsco was planning to
replace the TLC board so that the firm's poison pill could be
redeemed and the Kidsco tender offer could take place. According
to the relevant corporate bylaw, this special meeting was to be held
a minimum of thirty-five days after Kidsco came up with the requisite
10% of the shareholder proxies to order the meeting."5 Under
this formulation, the special meeting could have been held as early
as December 13, 1995. Before Kidsco delivered the proxies, however,
the TLC board met and revised the special meeting rules, changing
the minimum notice from thirty-five to sixty days. Under this new
formulation, the Kidsco special meeting could be held no earlier
than January 7, 1996.16 The TLC board argued that it did not
move to entrench itself, but rather to allow the shareholders to
consider the Broderbund acquisition free from the distraction of a
competing offer, and additionally, if the Broderbund vote failed, to
allow the firm time to find an alternate transaction to the Kidsco
tender.167 Kidsco argued that under Schnell, the board acted to
entrench itself, and that under Blasius, the board acted for the
primary purpose of impeding the stockholder franchise." The
chancery court agreed with TLC on both counts. On the Schnell
claim, the court found that a twenty-five day delay was not tanta-
mount to entrenchment. 6 9 On the Blasius claim, the court first
distinguished board action taken in response to ajoint tender/proxy
from board action taken solely in response to a tender offer.
170
Only in the face of a pure proxy fight, the court argued, would it
election did not constitute inequitable conduct, since it was defensive in nature and
would not lead to managerial entrenchment).
16 See id. at 488.
1
6 Although the court refers to the acquiring software company as SoftKey, the
corporate parent, the case name is Kidsco. See id. at 485. This Comment will refer to
the acquiring company as Kidsco to avoid confusion.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 489.
'61 See id. at 491-92.
168 See id. at 490-91.
10 See id. at 493.
1 0 See id. at 495.
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analyze the case under a Blasius standard."' The court declared
that when there is a joint tender/proxy both Unocal and Blasius
would be invoked-an enhanced Unocal standard.
72
That said, the court decided that Blasius was not properly invoked
in this case, since the board's action was not intended to impede the
shareholder franchise. The court declared that the bylaw change
giving the board an additional twenty-five days was not enacted for
the "'primary purpose' of impairing or impeding the effective
exercise of the franchise."' 7 Additionally, the court found that the
board action would not have the effect of impeding or impairing the
franchise. The court declared that the bylaw amendment was
defensive in nature, taken in response to the hostile offer.74
Analogizing to Stahl I, the court found that the delay was in "the
stockholders' best interests" because the board would now have more
time to evaluate the offer and look for alternatives. 75 As a result,
the court reviewed the defensive delay under the Unocal/Unitrin
reasonableness and proportionality tests and found that the delay was
valid. 76
The Kidsco decision augurs poorly for the future of the share-
holder franchise. The court applied the "primary purpose" analysis
from Blasius in a way that eviscerates the test. The court essentially
asked whether the primary purpose of the new bylaw, which
extended the target corporation's special meeting deadline, was to
postpone the election or to give the corporation more time to
respond to the tender offer. The court chose the latter, deciding
that the primary purpose was "to enable the TLC board to present
the Broderbund transaction to its shareholders in an environment
that would provide the board a reasonable time to explore and
171 See id.
1"2 See id. (declaring that when faced with a joint tender/proxy, "a board's
unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure 'touching upon issues of control' that
'purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders' will be evaluated under UnocaL" Even
within that framework, however, the board decision will be viewed as "strongly suspect
... and cannot be sustained without a 'compellingjustification'" (quoting Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992)) (alteration in original)).
'
7
3 Id. at 496.
174 See id.
" See id. But see ER Holdings, Inc. v. Norton Co., 735 F. Supp. 1094, 1102 (D.
Mass. 1990) (holding that when a firm's bylaws authorized a specific meeting date,
allowing a board to postpone the date for two months would cause the plaintiffs
"irreparable harm").
176 See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 497 (Del. Ch.) (stating that the
"board's response to the threatwas 'extremely mild'" (quoting Stahl v. Apple Bancorp,
Inc., 579A.2d 1115, 1125 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl))), afd, 670A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
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develop other options if the Broderbund deal were rejected."'
This analysis appears to be sensible since the board was not trying to
impede the shareholder franchise but was trying to protect the
shareholders and the corporation from what it viewed as a threat.
This reasoning, however, is in direct opposition to the holding in
Blasius and is the first step toward Time, Unitrin and untrammeled
managerial discretion. Had Blasius been decided by the Kidsco court,
the directors could have easily argued that the "primary purpose" of
the board packing scheme was not to interfere with the shareholder
franchise, but rather to protect the corporation from the miscon-
ceived plans of the insurgents. The Blasius holding was so powerful
because even though the board may have been completely correct in
fearing that the corporation would be irreparably harmed if the
challengers won, management still had no right to interfere with the
shareholder franchise. Managers are agents of the shareholders, not
"Platonic masters."
78
The court in Kidsco should have asked the more basic question:
Despite the ultimate goal of the election delay, did the board
purposefully interfere with the shareholder franchise? The answer
to this question is yes, since the board denied the shareholders the
ability to vote on the Kidsco offer as planned on December 13.17
Any other analysis would limit Blasius to only those cases where
boards cannot create a rational business reason for delaying an
election. This would mean the end of the Blasius "compelling
justification" standard.
177 Id. at 496.
11 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del. Ch. 1988).
179 Even if the court finds that management has impeded or precluded the
shareholder franchise, management may still have a "compellingjustification" for its
actions. Although not decided under Blasius, MAI Basic Four, Inc., v. Prime Computer,
No. CIV.A.10868, 1989 WL 63900 (Del. Ch. June 13, 1989), is a good example of a
case where the "compelling justification" language could have been applied. In this
case, a party making ajoint tender/proxy offer changed the nature of his tender offer
two weeks before the election. The offer changed from all cash for all shares to a two-
tiered front-loaded offer, with "junk" paper on the back end. See id. at *1. In
response, management delayed the election for six weeks. The court allowed the
election delay as a legitimate defensive measure, explaining that
[t]he proxy battle ... is merely part of Basic's effort to acquire the shares
of Prime and it is obviously in the best interests of the Prime shareholders
that they ultimately receive the best possible price for their shares. If the
election goes forward tomorrow any chance for a higher price for Prime
shares may vanish.
See id. at *2.
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Perhaps sensing the weakness in its "primary purpose" analysis,
the Kidsco court added a second level of analysis. The court claimed
that the twenty-five day delay did not interfere with the shareholder
franchise, since at the time of the bylaw change the shareholders had
not yet presented the necessary proxies to call the special meeting.
As a result, the shareholders had no legal right to the meeting. This
analysis, however, is also inconsistent with the Blasius holding. There
is no question that the board had the legal authority to delay the
meeting date."'0 The question was whether the board used its legal
powers for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of the
shareholder franchise.
The court's references to Stahl Iwere also unwarranted. In Stahl
, the court held that there was "some dignity and significance" to the
fixing of an election date."' Since the date had not been set and
the board was under no obligation to set a date for some time, a
deferral of the date was not an impediment to the franchise."' In
Kidsco, however, there is no such parallel argument. The board
changed the bylaws at the last possible moment to keep the share-
holders from voting on both transactions at almost the same time.
Perhaps the board felt that its chosen deal would have fared poorly.
The court could have also argued that the election delay was de
minimis since a twenty-five day delay may not have cost Kidsco
anything. The court implied this line of reasoning in referring to the
"brief deferral" of the election.' It is possible to read the Dela-
ware case law as being consistent with this analysis. In Aprahamian,
delaying the meeting would have been very costly to the plaintiffs
since their proxies would expire and become void by the next
"s If the board had not had the legal authority to adopt the bylaw, the case could
have been decided in a formal and technical manner, predicated on a literal reading
of the requisite statute. See, e.g., Allen v. Prime Computer Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 421
(Del. 1988) (holding that a bylaw that mandated a 20-day delay in the effectiveness
of shareholder consents was void as it violated shareholder rights under the consent
authorization section of the corporation law); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496
A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 1985) (holding that a bylaw adopted by management to
postpone a consent solicitation for 60 days was unenforceable because it was "clearly
in conflict with the letter and intent of' the shareholder consent authorization section
of the corporation law).
.8. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl 1).
8 See, e.g., Savin Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Rapifax Corp., 375 A.2d 469, 472 (Del. Ch.
1977) (holding that a shareholder has no right to insist that an annual meeting be
held at a certain time).
183 Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 496 (Del. Ch.), aft'd, 670 A.2d 1338
(Del. 1995).
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election date.18 1 In barring the delay, the court spoke of the
shareholders having "expended considerable sums of money on this
proxy contest.'18 5 In Stahl I, on the other hand, the insurgent was
a 30% shareholder who had not yet expended any resources on the
election or solicited any proxies.' The size of his holdings,
however, indicated that he would have little trouble winning an
election when one was held. 7 Thus, even if the court had not
decided Stahl I on the narrow ground of the setting of an initial
election date, it still could have argued that the franchise was not
impeded since no real harm was done to the plaintiff.
Although this "de minimis" argument would have been more
consistent with the Delaware case law than the arguments the court
made, it still would not have been correctly applied to Kidsco. The
"brief deferral" in Kidsco could have caused major harm to the
plaintiff. The small change in the meeting date altered the entire
nature of the election. Because the original election dates were only
two days apart, a reasonable shareholder could see this as an
opportunity to weigh the competing choices and pick the better deal:
management's recommended deal with Broderbund or the Kidsco
offer. By delaying the vote on the Kidsco deal, a reasonable
shareholder might be concerned that if she did not accept the
Broderbund deal, management might impose a third, less palatable
option before the January Kidsco vote. Thus, a risk-averse share-
holder who might prefer the Kidsco offer to the Broderbund offer
might reluctantly vote for the Broderbund offer to avoid the risk of
some unspecified management offer.
188
114 SeeAprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Del. Ch. 1987).
185 Id.
186 See Stahl I, 579 A.2d at 1118-19.
187 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A.11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl 11) (stating that "[s]hould the board fail to develop an
attractive alternative, experience suggests that it is quite likely, particularly considering
his 30% personal ownership, that Mr. Stahl's position will be accepted by a substantial
majority of shareholders in the proxy contest").
11 See San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d
1000, 1003 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that "'loss of [a] best opportunity to seize control
of a major corporation ... could be crucial'" (quoting Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701
.2d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1983)) (alterations in original)).
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2. Limitations on Shareholder Ownership I-Poison Pill Cases
Unlike the "election delay" cases, the poison pill cases present an
actual "primary purpose" question. The purpose of enacting the
shareholder rights plans in most cases was not to impede the proxy
contest, but rather to defend against a hostile tender offer.
In Moran v. Household International Inc.,"8 9 the plaintiff claimed
that the target firm's shareholder rights plan, which had a 20%
trigger, effectively precluded him from engaging in a successful
proxy contest.190 The argument was very sensible since the fewer
shares the proxy solicitor owned, the more he had to rely on other
shareholders in a proxy contest. Likewise, the fewer shares owned,
the greater the collective action problem, since the solicitor would
have to "share the capital-gain potential with all other shareholders"
while expending the entire amount for the contest himself. 1 ' The
Delaware Supreme Court, on the basis of anecdotal evidence,
decided that the effect of the restriction on the proxy contest would
be "minimal" and that "the key variable in proxy contest success is
the merit of an insurgent's issues, not the size of his holdings.
" 192
The court relied on evidence provided by Household's witnesses, who
described cases in which insurgents with "less than 10% stock owner-
ship" mounted successful proxy contests.193
In the ten years since Moran was decided, accumulated data on
the level of success of insurgents in proxy contests have been
evaluated. The studies have found that "limits on dissident stock
ownership negatively affect the likelihood of dissident success in a
proxy contest. "194 This new data, however, have not been used in
any court decision. In Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services,
Inc., the district court went so far as to cite the holding in Moran,
1 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
' See id. at 1355 (holding that a poison pill with a 20% trigger did not preclude
a proxy fight).
191 Manne, supra note 20, at 114. Manne added that "to the outsider seeking
control, every voter represents another person with whom he must share the potential
gain resulting from his more efficient management." Id. at 115.
192 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
193 Id.
" Thomas & Martin, supra note 16, at 336. The authors were surprised to find
that the existence of rights plans was positively correlated with dissident victories.
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the rights plan discouraged
shareholders who did not believe that they had a significant chance of success. See id.
at 335-36; see also Thomas, supra note 75, at 552-58 (analyzing the impact of rights
plans on dissident election campaigns).
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reiterating that the existence of a poison pill with a 20% trigger did
not "[a]ffect... the success of the proxy contest."195
The chancery court dealt with the poison-pill-ownership-limitation
issue in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc. ("Stahl IF').196 Stahl, a 30%
shareholder, was joining a tender offer and a proxy contest. Because
the firm's poison pill kept Stahl from accumulating more shares for
himself, he wanted to enter into agreements with other shareholders
to form committees, run on the same slate or help share the cost of
the proxy contest. The firm's rights plan, however, declared that a
shareholder would be considered the "beneficial owner" of any stock
"with which such person ... has any agreement, arrangement or
understanding... for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or
disposing of any securities." 97 As a result of this language, if Stahl
and another shareholder agreed to work together to oppose
management, then Stahl would be considered the beneficial owner
of that person's stock and the poison pill would be triggered,
diluting Stahl's holdings. The company argued that it needed this
provision to prevent Stahl from reaching agreements with other
shareholders regarding the election contest. If Stahl were to reach
an agreement with other shareholders, potential bidders would
realize that Stahl had the election locked up and would be deterred
from making bids.1 98
The court reviewed the Moran holding without challenging the
finding that the effect of the poison pill on the proxy contest would
be "immaterial." In fact, the court extended the Moran reasoning to
the prohibition on voting agreements. The court declared:
"[I oting agreements or understandings of the type here.., could
be (and in this instance probably are) immaterial in the sense that
a shareholder may put forth a slate of candidates and communicate
her position to others, and others may vote for that slate without
restriction."199
The court dismissed Stahl's Blasius claim because the rights plan
did not have the "primary purpose of interfering with the exercise of
... Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 E Supp. 1545, 1563 (D.
Del. 1995).
116 No. CIV.A.11510, 1990 WL 114222 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl1f). The firm
had its annual meeting earlier to allow it more time to respond to Stahl's attack. The
court allowed the delay. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del.
Ch. 1990) (Stahl 1) (holding that deferral of the meeting date was valid).
17 Stahl I, 1990 WL 114222, at *3.
198 See id. at *3-4.
19 Id. at *6.
SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE-NO COMPROMISE
the shareholders' right to elect directors," even though it may have
that effect.200 The court believed that there was little harm done
by the prohibition. Because of Stahl's large personal ownership, and
because he was making an all shares cash offer, the court reasoned
that if the "board fail [ed] to develop an attractive alternative," Stahl's
offer would probably "be accepted by a substantial majority of
shareholders in the proxy contest."2 1 Thus, the court argued that
the impact of the prohibitions on Stahl's proxy efforts would be
minimal.
3. Limitations on Shareholder Ownership II-
Dilution and Entrenchment Cases
Diluting the opponent's shares or placing the shares out of the
opponent's reach represents another tactic that can be used to
defend against a tender offer or a proxy contest. The board can
accomplish this goal by issuing new shares to a friendly party, or by
buying back shares from dissatisfied shareholders who would have
otherwise voted against management. These transactions limit the
number of shares that the opponent can hope to recruit to her
cause, and conversely, decrease the number of independently held
shares that management must win. The courts have generally found
these tactics to be valid, so long as they are not done for the
"primary purpose" of interfering with the proxy contest.
In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,2 °2 Shamrock had
been attempting to acquire Polaroid. Along with a tender offer,
Shamrock made plans to conduct a proxy contest and replace the
Polaroid board at the next annual meeting.2 03  As a defensive
measure, Polaroid adopted an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP") and a stock repurchase plan to increase the percentage of
the firm's shares in friendly hands.2 04  Shamrock claimed that
because the plans reduced its ability to win a proxy fight, the court
should find them invalid as they were undertaken for the purpose of
interfering with the electoral process.20 5
The chancery court disagreed, finding that the ESOP and buy-
back plans had been reviewed and negotiated "several weeks, if not
1oo Id. at *7.
201 I& at *8.
202 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
203 See id. at 285.
204 See id. at 281.
205 See id. at 285-86.
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months" before the announcement of the proxy contest.206 Even
though "the directors were aware of the possibility of a proxy fight"
and considered it in their deliberations, the record indicates that
"the directors were focusing more on ways to defeat Shamrock in the
market place than upon a means to defeat it at the polls."20 7 Thus,
unlike in Blasius, these defensive measures were not undertaken with
the "primary purpose" of interfering with the electoral process.
28
In a second analysis, the court looked at the outcome of the
defensive moves in order to test whether the management plans were
"preclusive." According to the court, the management steps were not
preclusive to the shareholder franchise because the plaintiff could
still accumulate enough votes to win an election. Because the
management and the ESOP owned a combined 33.4% of the shares,
while Shamrock itself owned 9.6% of the voting shares, 57% of the
shares were "uncommitted."2 9 By winning 70% of those shares,
Shamrock could get the 50% of the vote it needed to win. 210 As
support for its argument that Shamrock had not been precluded, the
court argued that because "at least 22% of Polaroid's outstanding
stock [wa]s held by arbitrageurs and other 'short term' investors,"
Shamrock would be going into the election "with about the same
percentage of likely votes as will Polaroid."
211
The problem with this analysis, and the analysis in the "poison
pill" voting cases, lies in the court's conclusory argument that
Shamrock has not been precluded from winning the election.
Certainly, so long as management has less than 50% of the vote, the
insurgent could still theoretically win. But this "preclusion" analysis
ignores the fact that the shareholder's chances have been signifi-
cantly diminished. Winning a proxy contest where management
206 Id. at 286.
201 Id. at 286 (claiming that "[t]he timing... is much less suspicious here than it
was in Blasius"). But see NCR Corp. v. AT&T, 761 F Supp. 475, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(holding that an ESOP was an invalid form of entrenchment, as "it]he timing of the
ESOP is ... enough to raise an inference that it was motivated by a desire to
perpetuate management control").
20 Cf Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 186 (Del. Ch. 1993) (holding that a
stock issuance that diluted the shares of a challenger for control was valid since it was
"the outgrowth of a long-term plan pursued by management for more than a year").
For a discussion of this case, see BarryJ. Benzing, Glazer v. Zapata Corp.: Under What
Circumstances May a Board of Directors Interfere with a Shareholder Vote?, 19 DEL.J. CORP.
L. 464 (1994).




owns a small percentage of the firm is difficult enough because of
rational apathy and the shareholders' propensity to vote with
management. 212 Winning a contest where management is already
two-thirds of the way to victory is very likely impossible.218 Al-
though the court argued that the presence of arbitrageurs and other
short-term investors would give the shareholder support, the court
made no effort to provide quantitative proof that the ESOP and
buyback would not preclude the shareholder's chances.
The relationship between the outcome and the purpose of the
transaction presents a second problem with the Shamrock court's
analysis. According to the court, "[t]he effect of the Management
Transactions ... does not provide strong evidence of a primary
purpose to interfere with the election."2 4 This statement implies
that the "primary purpose" analysis only applies to cases where the
purpose is total preclusion. It is not out of the question, however,
that management would take steps for the primary purpose of
impeding, but not precluding, the vote. For example, management
would likely have wanted to place 50% of the shares in friendly
hands, but may have been unable to do so because of the high cost.
Thus, management settled for placing 33% of the shares out of
Shamrock's reach. The board should not be rewarded for its
inability totally to preclude the shareholder's election chances. A
serious impediment to victory, just as a total preclusion, must be
considered a violation of the shareholder's franchise rights.
The supreme court's most recent decision in this area is Unitrin,
Inc. v. American General Corp.215 American General had made a bid
for all the shares of Unitrin at a 30% premium above the market
price. 216 The Unitrin board refused the offer as inadequate and
instituted three defensive measures: a poison pill, an advance notice
212 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, supranote 29, at 1084-85 (explaining the advantages
of incumbency in a proxy contest, including full reimbursement of expenses,
informational advantages and goodwill).
21. See Packer v. Yampol, No. CIV.A.8432, 1986 WL 4748, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,
1986) (holding that when a company puts 44% of the voting stock in the hands of one
group, election victory will be almost certainly assured because "the concentration of
such voting power ... will ... cause stockholders to perceive that the result is a
foregone conclusion, thereby fatally chilling any proxy solicitation by the dissident
shareholders' group").
214 Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 286.
215 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995) (holding that so long as a defensive move was
not preclusive and was within the "range of reasonableness" it would be upheld).
216 See id. at 1368.
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bylaw and a stock repurchase program. 17 The chancery court
found that the poison pill and the advance notice bylaw constituted
appropriate responses to the "low ball" bid.218 The stock repur-
chase program, though, was found to be "an overreaction to the
threat posed by American General's offer."219 One of the reasons
behind the court's finding was that the directors of Unitrin already
owned 23% of the firm's outstanding shares. After the planned
repurchase, their combined holdings would rise to over 28%.221
The court declared that even though American General could
theoretically wage a proxy fight for control of the Unitrin board,
"each share repurchased under this plan makes a successful proxy
contest more unlikely. "22' Additionally, the Unitrin charter re-
quired a 75% supermajority vote of the shareholders to approve a
merger not approved by the board.22 The repurchase plan would
have given the directors, as shareholders, veto power over any
potential merger plan.
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this logic. First, the court
declared that the increased holdings on the part of the directors
would not "have a preclusive effect upon American General's ability
successfully to marshall [sic] enough shareholder votes to win a
proxy contest. "223 The court noted that 42% of Unitrin's share-
holders were institutions, with twenty institutions holding 33% of the
stock. These institutions would be more likely than other sharehold-
ers to vote against management.2 24  As for the director's "veto
power," the court reasoned that the directors would most likely vote
with their wallets and quoted the testimony of Fayez Sarofim, one of
Unitrin's directors, who stated that "everything has a price parame-
ter."
225
217 See id. at 1370.
211 See American Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc. (In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation), Nos. CIV.A.13656, 13699, 1994WL 698483, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14,1994),
rev'd, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
219 Id. at *9 (holding that a preliminary injunction against the repurchase plan was
necessary because the plan went "beyond what was needed to protect the stockhold-
ers").
221 See id. at *3.
221 Id. at *9. The chancery court, citing Packer v. Yampo4 No. CIV.A.8432, 1986 WL
4748 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986), stated that "[t]his Court does not have to ignore the
long odds of winning a proxy contest against a board that has acted to assure itself a
large block of friendly votes." Id.
See id. at *3.
22 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995).
224 See id. at 1382 (citing, inter alia, Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 925 (1992)).
1 Id. at 1383. The court also quoted Harold Hook, the American General
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The Delaware courts appear reluctant to invalidate measures that
interfere with the shareholder's ability to wage a proxy fight if the
company can show that the defenses were put in place to defend
against a tender offer.226 While not formally rejecting Blasius, the
courts are taking a step away from the ideal of an election process
free from managerial meddling. There are cases, however, where the
courts do not find a dual motive for the interference. In these cases,
where the primary purpose of the transaction was unquestionably to
preclude a proxy contest, the courts have demanded that the barriers
be removed.227
In a recent case, Commonwealth Associates v. Providence Health Care,
Inc., 228 a company facing a consent solicitation made a friendly deal
to exchange 20% of its own stock for 40% of another firm's
stock.2 19 The second firm immediately granted a consent to the
directors to vote the 20% of the shares for the incumbent board.
Because the manager of the target firm already owned 30% of the
stock, this effectively ended the proxy fight.80 In its decision,
though, the chancery court did not focus on the issue of whether the
effect of the deal would be to impede or preclude the shareholder
franchise. Rather, the court asked whether the interference with the
Chairman, who stated that directors who own stock "will act in their own best interest
if the price is high enough." Id.
11 See Lennane v. ASK Computer Sys., Inc., No. CLV.A.11744, 1990 WL 154150, at
*5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1990) (validating an agreement which secured the right of
incumbent directors to control the voting of 30% of the firm's stock, but finding it
"deeply troubling").
7 See, e.g., Gregory v. Correction Connection Inc., No. CIV.A.88-7990, 1991 WL
42992, at *28 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1991) (finding that a corporate stock issuance that
had the effect of diluting the majority shareholder to a minority position did not meet
the Blasius "altered Unocal' inquiry because, even though the corporation needed to
raise money, it did not prove that the issuance was "the least restrictive means" of
doing so); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 408 (Del. 1985) (finding that
a board attempt to dilute the shares of a new majority shareholder by funding an
ESOP with treasury shares was an inequitable action); Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297,
304 (Del. Ch. 1994) (arguing in dictum that when "a board of directors acts in good
faith and on the reasonable belief that a controlling shareholder is abusing its power
... the board might permissibly [dilute the shares of the majority shareholder]"
(citation omitted)); Canada S. Oils Ltd.v. Manabi Exploration Co., 96 A.2d 810, 813
(Del. Ch. 1953) (holding that a transaction involving the issuance of shares was invalid
because "the primary purpose behind the sale of these shares was to deprive plaintiff
of the majority voting control").
m No. CIV.A.13135, 1993 WL 432779, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993) (holding that
management violated its duty of loyalty by taking action to thwart the effective
exercise of a shareholder's consent solicitation).
22 See id. at *6.
2 See id. at *1.
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franchise was "collateral," which does not constitute an equitable
wrong, or whether it was done for the primary purpose of winning the
proxy contest.231 The court found that the stock placement was an
intentional interference with voting rights, since it was apparent from
the facts that the "principal, indeed probably the sole reason" for the
deal was to prevent a change in control. 32
4. Advance Notice Requirements and Misuse of
Election Machinery Cases
Management can also impede an election by putting up structural
barriers to the nomination of directors and the presentation of
proxies. The Delaware jurisprudence in this area is unclear. In
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data Inc., a corporation adopted a bylaw
amendment that required anyone (other than management) who
wished to nominate candidates for the board to do so "not less than
seventy days prior to any meeting of stockholders called for the
election of directors." 233 Management took advantage of this bylaw
when it announced that the annual meeting would be held in sixty-
three days, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a challenge.234
The chancery court, applying Schnell, found that the application of
the bylaw amendment was invalid because it had "a terminal effect
on the aspirations" of the challenger.2 5
In Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty, the chancery court also found
that an advance notice bylaw had been inequitably applied.3 6 The
231 See id. at *8.
232 Id.; see also WNH Invs. v. Batzel, No. CIV.A.13931, 1995 WL 262248, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 28, 1995) (holding that "the purpose of the dilutive issuance was to defeat
the challenge to the board's control"); Packer v. Yampol, No. GIV.A.8432, 1986 WL
4748, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) ("An inequitable purpose can be inferred where
the directors' conduct has the effect of being unnecessary under the circumstances,
of thwarting shareholder opposition, and of perpetuating management in office.").
"' 421 A.2d 906, 909 (Del. Ch. 1980).
2 See id. at 911.
235 Id. at 912. In International Banknote Co. v. Muller, the district court found that
a 45-day advance notice requirement, adopted one day after the announcement of a
proxy fight and 58 days before the annual meeting, was a breach of the directors' duty
of care. See 713 F. Supp. 612, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court also declared that the
defendants could meet their burden at trial by showing, under Unocal that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that there was a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness, and that their response was reasonable. See id.
236 No. CIV.A.11779, 1991 WL 8151, at *11 (Del. Ch.Jan. 14, 1991) (holding that
a neutral advance notice bylaw was inequitably applied when an unforeseen change
in circumstances demanded that the notice requirement be waived); see also Warren
& Abrams, supra note 13, at 666-68 (calling Hubbard an important development
[Vol. 145: 423
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court declared that even though "an advance notice by-law will be
validated where it operates as a reasonable limitation," it cannot be
used for inequitable purposes.3 7 The court held that the advance
notice bylaw operated to prevent the potential challengers from
reacting to a change in board policy that occurred after the
nomination deadline had expired. The court found that since there
was a "material change of circumstances," the bylaw should not be
enforced to prevent the challengers from nominating directors to the
board. 8
One of the more confusing cases in recent Delaware law, Stroud
v. Grace, dealt with the validity of a corporate bylaw that required
advance notice for the nomination of directors and allowed current
board members to disqualify the shareholders' nominees at any time
before the election.3 9 Shareholders challenged this bylaw, claim-
ing that under Blasius it impeded their exercise of the shareholder
franchise.240 The chancery court agreed, finding that "the By-law
as written clearly infringes upon the rights of Milliken stockholders
to nominate persons to the Board, and is therefore unfair and unrea-
sonable."
241
The supreme court reversed, stating that it was wrong for the
chancery court to apply the Blasius standard. While the court said
that it "accept[s] the basic legal tenets of ... Blasius, 242 it read the
standard as applicable only when the "'primary purpose' of the
board's actions was to interfere with or impede exercise of the share-
holder franchise."243 The court argued that because the board
members owned an absolute majority of the firm's stock they did not
face any threat to their control. Therefore the primary purpose of
the bylaw could not have been to impede the shareholder franchise.
because it signalled that the court may be willing to correct procedural unfairness
even in the absence of manipulative conduct).
I Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151, at *11.
"' Id. at *12. But seeNomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., Nos. CIV.A.10173,
10189, 1988 WL 383667, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1988) (finding that a 60-day advance
notice bylaw was not unreasonable because the plaintiffs failed to show that they had
suffered any harm).
" See 606 A.2d 75, 80 (Del. 1992).
240 SeeStroud v. Grace, No. CIV.A.10719, 1990 WL 176803, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11,
1990) (stating that the defendants' acts must be reviewed for intrinsic fairness
"because the amendments directly affect the exercise of the stockholder franchise"),
afd in part, rev'd in par 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
241 Id. at *13.
242 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 91.
243 Id. at 92.
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Moreover, the bylaw was approved by a majority of the corporation's
shareholders.
24
This argument raised the question of the roles of "purpose" and
"outcome" in shareholder franchise analysis. Even assuming that the
court was correct that the "purpose" of the bylaw was not to impede
the franchise, the "outcome" of the bylaw was that directors could
reject any and all challengers as unqualified-certainly an inequitable
result. The court, however, argued that the outcome-the transfer
of power from shareholders to directors-was fair since it was ratified
by the shareholders.2 45 The court also addressed the role of Blasius
and declared that it fit within the framework of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Corp.246 When the board "'adopts any defensive measure
taken in response to some threat to corporate policy and effective-
ness which touches upon issues of control,'" the Unocal standard
must be applied.24 7 The court added that because of the impor-
tance of the shareholders' franchise, a board's action "that purpose-
fully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect" and "cannot
be sustained without 'a compelling justification.
' 21
5. Continuing Director Provisions
The only case to address this issue is Bank of New York v. Irving
Bank.249 One of the defensive measures taken by Irving Bank in its
efforts to fend off a hostile bid was the addition of a bylaw amend-
ment denying any board elected by insurgents the ability to redeem
the poison pill, unless that board was elected with a vote of at least
two-thirds of the shares. The court struck down the amendment as
24 See id. The firm, Milliken Enterprises, was controlled by the descendants of the
founder. Shareholders controlling 17% of these shares comprised the dissident
group. The core family group, including those on the board, controlled the majority
of the stock. The bylaw was approved by 78% of the eligible voting shares. See id. at
79-81.
245 The shareholders who ratified the rules included the board, who owned or
controlled more than 50% of the corporation's stock. See id. at 79. The court did not
discuss this potential conflict of interest.
2" 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1986).
24 Stroud 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (quoting Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144
(Del. 1990)).
24 Id. The Delaware courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation of
Blasius. Compare Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty, No. CIV.A.11779, 1991 WL 3151,
at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (calling Blasius "a particularized application of the
Schnell doctrine"), with Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286
(Del. Ch. 1989) (finding that the Blasius standard was a "specific expression of the
proportionality test" from UnocaO.
2- 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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"contrary to the statute" delegating power to the board of direc-
tors.250  According to the court, the reason the amendment was
invalid was "not that it deprives a Board of certain powers," but
rather because "it is selective in the deprivation."
251
6. Supermajority Voting Cases
Just as in the limitation cases, when a board adopts a super-
majority voting provision, the courts examine the measure for
purpose rather than outcome. In Williams v. Geier, a company that
was 36% family-owned created a system in which a holder of a share
of stock was entitled to ten votes per share if that stock was held
continuously for three years. 52 This plan was designed in part to
deter arbitrageurs and other raiders looking for a short-run gain.
The plan was challenged as a scheme to allow the family to retain
control. The Williams court acknowledged that the plan would have
some entrenchment effect but argued that "the fact that a plan has
an entrenchment effect does not mean that it was so motivated."
25 -3
The court examined the motives behind the plan and found them
acceptable. 54
D. A Jurisprudence of Contradictions
To summarize the seemingly confused and contradictory case law,
the Delaware courts have held:
* A shareholder rights plan which restricts the number of shares that
one shareholder can own, and punishes an individual for entering
into voting agreement with other shareholders, was not considered
interference with the shareholder franchise because the interference
was "minimal."
255
m Id. at 486. The statute the court referred to is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b)
(McKinney 1986), which lists the conditions under which the powers of the board may
be modified.
251 Id. at 485.
22 See No. CIV.A.8456, 1994WL 514871, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1994), affd, 671
A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
2 Id. at *3.
' See id. (stating that "the directors were motivated by the good faith belief that
long term corporate planning would be enhanced by the recapitalization plan").
I Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIVAI.11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl ).
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* A defensive measure where a board funds an employee stock option
plan with corporate stock to fend off a tender offer is not interfer-
ence with the franchise, even though management will be assured of
33% of the vote, two-thirds of what it needs for victory.
256
* A last-minute bylaw change postponing an election that would offer
the shareholders an alternative to the board's plans was not consid-
ered interference with the vote because the primary purpose of the
plan was defensive.
2 57
* A bylaw that allows current directors to reject board candidates
nominated by opponents is valid where the move has been approved
by the shareholders.
258
* A decision by a board of directors not to call a regularly scheduled
election when it appears that they will lose is considered a valid
measure because there is no requirement that the election be called
in the first place.259
While the courts have upheld decisions that allow significant
interference with the franchise, they have also made statements such
as "[w] here the franchise is involved, a special obligation falls upon
courts to review with care action that impinges upon legitimate
election activities. '260 Part V of this Comment suggests a means of
interpreting the case law and suggests a clear standard for analysis.
IV. WHY UNIMPEDED SHAREHOLDER VOTING IS VITAL
TO THE CORPORATE LAW
5 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch.
1989).
25 See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 496 (Del. Ch.), affd 670 A.2d 1338
(Del. 1995).
See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. Ch. 1992).
See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123-24 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl
1) (limiting its holding to the "narrow ground" where no meeting has been set and
no proxies have yet been solicited and noting that a breach of fiduciary duty would
occur if the board rescinded an election for fear of losing).
260 Stahl I, 1990 WL 114222, at *5.
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A. The Economic Justification for the Shareholder Franchise
To understand why it is imperative that the courts strike down
managerial attempts to limit shareholder voting, it is important to
understand the role voting plays in corporate law and theory.
Economics helps explain how corporations are organized and why
the shareholder vote is so vital to corporate efficiency. Professors
Berle and Means noted that the separation of ownership and control
found in most large corporations raises the fear that managers will
run the firm in their own interest, rather than in the interest of the
shareholders."' To control and limit this divergence of interests,
the shareholders must oversee the managers' behavior. The costs
associated with this oversight are known as agency costs. They
include the costs of monitoring management, bonding costs to align
managerial and shareholder interests,262 and the residual expenses
that can not be efficiently eliminated.263
The market for capital helps to monitor management.2
Corporations must compete for capital. Managers who run firms for
their own benefit rather than for the benefit of the shareholder may
find themselves unable to raise funds.265 Shareholders, who are the
residual claimants266 to the firm's income, will provide capital only
261 SeeBERLE & MEANs, supra note 17, at 119-25 (suggesting that managers may aim
to maximize their own profits, prestige or power). This idea is not new. See ADAm
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937)
(1776) ("The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of
other peoples money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own.").
262 These include performance related bonuses and options. But see George W.
Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 881, 886-87 (arguing that performance-based compensation is a poor method for
controlling managerial behavior since management helps create the compensation
schedules).
263 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (arguing
that the existence of agency costs explains the organization of firms and related
corporate behavior).
264 SeeFrank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors'Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 544 (1984) ("Managers may do their best to take
advantage of investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to
act as if they had investors' interests at heart.").
2" See id. (arguing that the competitive market for capital is a "limitation on
managers' efforts to enrich themselves at investors' expense").
266 Under the "nexus of contract" view of the firm, shareholders do not "own" the
company in the traditional private property sense. Rather, they are one of many
parties who have contracted to provide various inputs in exchange for certain
19961
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if the firm is managed efficiently. It would seem logical that
shareholders and managers would simply contract as to how the
corporation will be managed, but this would be inefficient. In order
to account for market shifts and new technologies, shareholders must
allow managers the flexibility to direct the firm as the managers see
fit.267  In order to ensure that management is not abusing its
power, however, the shareholders demand the right to vote so that
they can remove inefficient managers. Managers, knowing that
shareholders can vote them out of office if the firm's fortunes lag,
will manage the firm in the shareholders' best interest.
26 8
As mentioned earlier, the collective action problem and the
availability of the tender offer made shareholder voting a non-issue
for many years. Today, however, with institutional investors having
overcome the collective action and rational apathy problems, and
with the tender offer precluded by the poison pill and state antitake-
over statutes, the proxy has become not only the preferred but also
the only available instrument for the monitoring and control of
management.
269
It is often asked why the corporation is run for the interest of the
shareholders rather than for the employees, the creditors, the
community or society as a whole. Shareholders have the least to do
outcomes. For example, the employees are providing labor in exchange for a salary.
Creditors provide capital in exchange for a fixed rate of return. Shareholders provide
capital as well, but rather than demanding a specific return, shareholders have
contracted for a residual interest-what is left when all other parties have been paid.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1426-27 (1993).
267 See Commonwealth Assoc. v. Providence Health Care, Inc., No. C1V.A.13135,
1993 WL 432779, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993) ("In a technological, market economy
these corporate enterprises require broad power and discretion in the hands of boards
and managers in order to enable the enterprise to adapt to changing markets in a
timely way."). The court noted that shareholders give managers this power so that
"action taken for the sole or primary purpose of impeding the effectiveness of the
shareholder vote is deeply suspect...." Id.
268 SeeEASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 68 ("[Mjanagers' knowledge...
that the [shareholders'] claims could be aggregated and votes exercised, lead
managers to act in shareholders' interest in order to advance their own careers and
to avoid being ousted.").
269 Commentators caution that the promise of institutional monitoring may not be
realized. See Black, supra note 63, at 817 (claiming that political and managerial
influence may chill the ability of institutions to effectively monitor management);
Rock, supra note 4, at 464 (arguing that institutional investors are another level of
agents, creating agency costs of their own). Institutions have agendas of their own.
See, e.g., Nick Gilbert, Glass Houses, FIN. WORLD, July 4, 1995, at 26 (claiming that the
managers of TIAA-CREF, one of the largest pension funds, have "been on a politically
correct crusade" to increase race and gender diversity on corporate boards).
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with the firm of all the corporate constituencies. Shareholders can
and will sell their shares for a small premium.2 0  Unlike other
constituencies, shareholders have the potential to be well diversified.
If a company goes bankrupt, the shareholder has lost only a small
portion of her investment portfolio, while the employee has lost her
livelihood .2 1 Economists have answered this question through the
"nexus of contract" analysis, claiming that efficiency demands that
the party who is the residual risk bearer be in a position to oversee
the performance of the firm. Of all the constituencies involved in
the corporation, only the shareholders have the correct incentives:
to reduce costs and increase revenues as much as possible. Because
shareholders are paid after the parties who have formally contracted
with the firm, such as employees, creditors and suppliers, a rational
shareholder will demand that the firm be run profitably so that there
will be money left for her. To defend this assertion, economists
point to the evidence, arguing that since shareholders do have the
right to vote, this is the efficient solution. 2
Many academics, however, have argued that management needs
to look beyond the narrow, short term, profit-maximizing interests of
the shareholders.2 73  State constituency statutes demand as
270 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 194 (1991)
(stating that "the stockholder/investors of the modem publicly held corporation view
the corporation like a holder of a betting slip views a horse," caring only about her
payoff and ignoring the fate of the company).
In See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theoiy of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON.
288, 291 (1980) (stating that "portfolio theory tells us that the optimal portfolio for
any investor is likely to be diversified across the securities of many firms," so that "an
individual security holder generally has no special interest in personally overseeing
the detailed activities of any firm"); see also Henning, supra note 66, at 578 (stating
that "[s] takeholders in a corporation depend on a firm's stability and its continuation
as an enterprise to protect their investments; in short, stakeholders are risk averse").
27 SeeEASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 14, at 67 (arguing that this arrangement
maximizes a firm's value because "[t]he gains and losses from abnormally good or bad
performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line").
2 A recent chancery court case could give these "entity theorists" an economic
basis for their arguments. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991). In the case of a "corporation operating in the vicinity of insolvency," the court
found that the directors owed their duty not to the shareholders, but to the corporate
enterprise. Id. The reason for this switch is that the shareholders, who were about
to wind up with nothing, had the incentive to take an unreasonable gamble with the
money that would have otherwise gone to the creditors upon the dissolution of the
firm. Thus, managers in this situation must act in the interest of the "corporate
enterprise," rather than the interests of the shareholders. See id. at n.55. Many
people would argue that shareholders are always willing to take unreasonable and
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muchY.2 4 This has been a lively issue in corporate law for most of
this century and remains so today.2 75
During the 1980s, Delaware courts had to face this question when
dealing with takeover defense cases. In these cases, shareholders
were voluntarily tendering their stock, but management was refusing
to redeem the poison pill so that a takeover could occur. The courts
decided that "corporate directors, if they act in pursuit of some
vision of the corporation's long-term welfare, may take action that
precludes shareholders from accepting an immediate high-premium
offer for their shares."
2 76
inefficient gambles with other people's jobs, health and futures. See, e.g., Ronald M.
Green, Shareholders As Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1420 (blaming the Bhopal disaster on the "chain of
business reasoning predicated on the shareholder model," where investments in safety
were not made because of concerns about "quarterly results").
4 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 975 (1992) (arguing that "the statutes should not
provide a cloak behind which the behavior of self-interested directors may escape
scrutiny"); Orts, supra note 39, at 14 (reviewing the history and policy behind the
constituency statutes).
275 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) (claiming that a "rational manager has
good reason to be risk averse, while the fully diversified shareholder has every reason
to be risk neutral"); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation
for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513, 531-80 (1993) (arguing that corporations
and their employees have been harmed by the shareholder focus on short-term profit
maximization); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd
Debate Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 55 (1991) (arguing that courts and
legislatures have yet to resolve the question of whether directors owe a duty to parties
other than shareholders).
27 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 276 (1992) (stating that courts and legislators have endorsed
the "entity" view of a corporation). The Delaware courts believe that shareholders
have difficulty appreciating the long-term benefits of corporate action, while
management is better situated to understand these future benefits. See, e.g., Unitrin,
Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (noting the chancery
court's opinion to have acknowledged that "the directors of a Delaware corporation
have the prerogative to determine that the market undervalues its stock and to protect
its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long term value of the corporation
under its present management plan"); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) (claiming that shareholders may be "ignorant" or
"mistaken" about the long-term benefits of a proposed merger); TW Servs., Inc. v.
SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. CIV.A.10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2, 1989) (arguing that "directors, in managing the business and affairs of the
corporation, may find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are
expected to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run
share value can be expected to be negatively affected" (footnote omitted)).
These arguments are strongly disputed by many economic theorists who claim
that the market price of a stock reflects its actual value. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON,
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The language used in these cases suggests that the interests of the
shareholder are just one of a number of factors the management of
a firm needs to examine in making decisions about what is best for
the corporation. The supreme court stated that "the board's power
to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the
corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm
reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source."2' The court
found that a manager may take into account "the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders," mentioning creditors,
customers, employees and the community generally.
278
As more shareholders turn to the proxy as the means of effecting
corporate changes, the courts will have to face the question of
whether management should be allowed to defend itself against the
shareholder vote. Managers will argue that the importance of the
long-term viability of the corporation and the protection of its
various constituencies demands that short-term profit maximizing
shareholders not be allowed to impose their will on the corporate
entity. Although the supreme court has claimed that a heightened
standard is applied when management interferes with the ability of
shareholders to vote, 279 the court also claims to be applying a
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 156-204 (1986) (describing the
efficient capital market hypothesis and the market for information). But see Richard
A. Booth, Discounts and OtherMyseries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1055-
59 (1991) (explaining why shareholders and management tend to value stock
differently). There are other arguments against allowing management to take the
"long term" view. See Minow, supra note 50, at 224 (stating that "[n] o one is in favor
of an overly short-term outlook, but long-term may be a euphemism for something
that never happens").
277 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citations
omitted). The court's decision in Unocal was fiercely attacked:
Boards of directors did not seek to take into account other constituencies
out of a new-found enthusiasm to do something nice for their employees or
surrounding communities. Their motivation, pure and simple, was to adopt
a new takeover defense that is applicable even when a tender offer would be
in the best interests of their shareholders.
Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 20 (1993).
278 Unoca4 493 A.2d at 955.
21 See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995)
(stating that "[this court has been and remains assiduous in its concern about
defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by
disenfranchising shareholders" (citations omitted)); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92
n.3 (Del. 1992) (stating that "[a] board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive
measure touching 'upon issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its
shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal and cannot be sustained without a
'compelling justification'").
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heightened standard when management rejects a tender offer. If
franchise interference cases are decided under the Unocal/Unitrin
line of cases, the court will likely be very deferential to management.
The Delaware courts are now at a crossroads. They can choose
to apply the "compelling justification" standard to corporate
franchise cases, a mixed version of Blasius and Unoca428 or the
deferential Unocal/ Unitrin standard. This Comment argues that the
courts need to assure that shareholders can exercise their franchise
unimpeded by management. There are a number of strong
arguments for the courts to protect the viability of the shareholder
vote.
1. The Need For Shareholder Monitoring of Management
In any agency relationship, there is a need for monitoring.
281
Anecdotal evidence of managerial misconduct would fill many
books.282 In our current corporate structure, the shareholder vote
is just one of the means by which managerial behavior is constrained.
Legal constraints include shareholder derivative suits, mandatory
disclosure, state and stock exchange governance requirements, and
antifraud laws. 283 Courts, however, will not interfere in the day-to-
day operation of the business, deferring to management deci-
sion.2 4 The shareholder derivative suit is an expensive, post hoc
tool, designed "only for remedying violations of legal norms, not for
policing underperformance, slack, or incompetence. "285
280 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1379 (stating that interference with the shareholder
franchise in response to ajoint tender offer/proxy fight would "'necessarily invoke[]
both Unocal and Blasius'" (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3)).
"s' SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 263, at 308 (stating that the "principal can
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent
and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the
agent").
282 See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Preaching but Not Practicing?: Austerity at Dial Does
Not Always Reach the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at DI, D3 (discussing managerial
extravagance at a corporation which is firing employees). But see, e.g., Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 270, at 195 (claiming that the assumption that managers are
self-interested is unfounded and that it is only the rare manager who acts to the
detriment of the corporation).
283 See Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 716 (arguing that even though managers are
not accountable to anyone, they operate in a "pervasive web of indirect accountability
mechanisms").
284 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(stating that "a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the
latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose'" (citing Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))).
285 CLARK, supra note 19, § 9.5, at 397 (noting that this is a "great problem" with
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Economic constraints also limit managerial behavior. Product
markets discipline managers, though only by threatening firms with
bankruptcy.1 6  The market for corporate control still pressures
managers to run their firms efficiently, but the era of the hostile
takeover has come to an end.28 7 Compensation schemes that offer
pay for performance are tools to align managers' interests with those
of the shareholders, but these plans are very hard to craft and are
created by management-dominated directors.2 as Creditor contracts
discipline management, but only to the extent that the corporation
is able to pay principal and interest when due. Lenders, however,
not only do not care whether the firm maximizes profits, they also
share some of the risk aversion of the managers." 9 Outside
directors are supposed to impart an independent viewpoint to
corporate decisionmaking, but for the most part have been deferen-
tial to management. 20 Currently, the only way for shareholders to
monitor management effectively is through the vote.
Even those who reject the shareholder-dominated view of the
corporation acknowledge the need to monitor management.2 91 Al-
the derivative suit).
I See Dent, supra note 262, at 886 (arguing that "[e]ven when bankruptcy does
discipline managers, it does so only at great costs to investors, employees and others").
217 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34, at 1169 (stating that "[t]he most
probable explanation for unfriendly takeovers emphasizes their role in monitoring the
performance of corporate managers"); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819,
875 (1981) (arguing that the tender offer is "the key displacement mechanism
through which the market for corporate control constrains management behavior").
I See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U.
CIN. L. REv. 649, 656 (1995) (stating that compensation becomes problematic when
"a board beholden to a particular executive agrees to a salary package upon
demand"); Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: An
Academic Perspective 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1992, 647,
671 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7017, 1992)
(arguing that "[i]ncentives impose risk on executives, and executives are poor risk
bearers").
See Dent, supra note 262, at 887.
See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. ofAm. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)
("The so-called outsiders... are often friends of the insiders."), rev'd on other grounds,
481 U.S. 69 (1987); William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are
They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2059 (citing cases in which special
committees of independent directors were unable or unwilling to provide meaningful
review of corporate actions); Dent, supra note 262, at 899-900 (arguing that outside
directors have limited knowledge about the firm, lack incentives to challenge the
CEO, and have had little effect on executive compensation); Lublin, Champion's
Chairman, supra note 51, at Al (describing how an embattled corporate chairman
handpicked friends and suppliers for the company's board).
11 See Black, supra note 224, at 927-31 (discussing the Japanese and European
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though alternative systems for monitoring may be possible,29 2 the
only one that currently exists is the shareholder franchise.295 In
fact, with the new proxy rules and increased power of institutions,
the ability of shareholders to monitor is greater now than ever
before.294 Institutions overcome the collective action problem
because their large holdings justify an investment in monitoring.
Large institutions also benefit from economies of scale. An institu-
tion owning a large percentage of a company's stock has reason to
invest more time and attention in casting an informed vote.295
Institutions, because of their huge size and long-term perspective, are
in the best position to ensure that corporations are managed for
long-term success. 296 The number of proxy fights and shareholder
proposals is increasing every year.297  This explains why manage-
experiences with corporate managerial monitoring by banks and insurance
companies); Estreicher, supra note 275, at 593-614 (suggesting professional outside
directors, shareholder advisory committees, relationship banking and enhanced
employee voice as alternatives to monitoring by "myopic" shareholders); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1302-05 (1992)
(arguing that shareholder voting should be abolished and replaced with judicial
oversight through derivative suits which could be brought by any corporate
constituent group).
' See Black, supra note 224, at 927-31 (discussing the role of institutional
monitoring in several European and Asian economies); Mitchell, supra note 291, at
1301-17 (contemplating a theory that replaces the shareholder franchise with an
independent and controlling board of directors).
's Former Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich offered a very logical solution to
this shareholder/constituency dichotomy. See Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These
Layoffs, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, atA21. The Secretary argued that the way to ensure
that corporations take employees and nonshareholders into account in their
decisionmaking would be for the government to alter the corporate incentive
structure. By reserving the benefits of incorporation for corporations that demon-
strate community responsibility, or by raising the tax rate for those that do not,
shareholders' profit maximization will necessarily demand the protection of employees
and communities. See id.
2'I See Marlene Givant Star, Investors Plan to Get Tough, Abandon Nice Guy Approach,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 26, 1992, at 3, 3, 33 (reporting that CalPERS, the
United Shareholders Association, the Council of Institutional Investors, and other
state and local retirement and pension funds have begun actively to target
underperforming companies through shareholder proposals).
" See Black, supra note 63, at 822 (suggesting that institutional investors, as large
shareholders, will actively participate in monitoring because the private gain from
monitoring exceeds the private cost).
I See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1356 (1992) (stating
that institutions have the time and incentive to monitor management and quoting an
institutional fund manager as stating "'we're the quintessential long-term investors'"
(citation omitted)).
' See Shareholders Gear UpforAnnual Rite, La . TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, atD2 ("[T]he
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ment is working now to oppose the shareholder proxy and why the
courts need to protect it.
2. Other Constituencies Are Now Shareholders
Many argue that the shareholder focus is misguided and that
corporations need to concern themselves with the interests of "other
constituencies," such as employees, creditors and customers.2 98
State legislatures have passed statutes allowing managers of target
companies to consider the impact of a proposed takeover on other
constituencies. 299 Although many scholars have argued that these
rules are harmful to the very constituencies they are intended to
protect,3 00 courts have accepted the notion that managers may
consider constituencies other than the shareholders in deciding
whether to accept a tender offer.30 1
Recent trends in stock ownership have indicated that these
"constituency statutes" may be counterproductive as employees and
community activists are becoming as well-represented as sharehold-
ers.012  The Teamsters union alone controls pension plans with
number of shareholders proposals related to board governance issues has surged 74%
from 1995 levels.").
29 See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 270, at 192 (arguing that the modern
public corporation is not private property, but is rather the central productive
element in the economy, affecting "the destinies of employees, communities,
suppliers, and customers").
m See Brownstein & Presser, supra note 43, at 397 (listing the states that have
passed constituency statutes and describing what they entail). The Missouri statute,
for example, allows a company's management to consider the impact on "employees,
suppliers, customers.., and the communities in which the corporation conducts its
businesses" when considering a hostile bid. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.347(4) (1995).
"' See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 274, at 1013 (arguing that "[t]here is avery real
possibility that unscrupulous directors will use nonshareholder interests to cloak their
own self-interested behavior"); Matheson & Olson, supra note 296, at 1351-54 (arguing
that corporations already rationally protect valuable inputs, so nonshareholder
constituency statutes protect primarily "suboptimal employees, suppliers, or
creditors"); Orts, supra note 39, at 24 (arguing that state legislatures passed corporate
constituency statutes in order to deter the hostile takeover of local firms).
01 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating
that managers may concern themselves with "the impact on 'constituencies' other
than shareholders"); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. CIV.A.10427,
10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("[D]irectors in pursuit of long
run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other
.corporate constituencies.'").
11 SeeAaron Bernstein, Labor Flexes its Musclea-As a Stockholder, Bus. W., July 18,
1994, at 79,79 (stating that since 1992, union-mounted proxy battles have quadrupled
and that 70 occurred during the first half of 1994).
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more than forty-six billion dollars in stock. 30 3 In 1994, unions
sponsored sixty corporate governance resolutions, making unions the
leading institutional sponsors of such proposals. 0 4 Employee stock
ownership has also expanded. There are now over 10,000 firms with
at least 5% employee ownership.305 Pension funds, which rank
among the largest of the institutional investors, have acted to protect
the rights of employees in the workplace. 06 Some institutions have
even taken up social causes, such as protecting the environment.0 7
In short, those who argue for an entity view of the corporation,
where managers are beholden to employees and other constituencies,
would be well advised to defend the shareholder franchise.
3. The Delaware Courts' Previous Decisions Were Predicated
on the Ability of Shareholders to Exercise
Their Franchise Rights
Consistency demands that the Delaware courts give the highest
level of protection to the shareholder franchise. Many of the
decisions in the takeover defense area were predicated on the idea
that if shareholders did not like the way the managers were running
the corporation, they had the ability to unseat and replace the
managers.30 8
30s See id.
so SeeJeff Cossette, A Consolidated Effort, INVESTOR REL., June 1, 1995, available in
WL, 1995 WL 10825511 ("One factor underlying the surge in labour activism is the
growth over the last decade in the value of union pension plans."). Unions are also
becoming more active in defending themselves through the vote. See Groskaufmanis,
supra note 63, at 21 (stating that in place of work stoppages, strikes and pickets,
unions are using proxy contests to fight the company "like a shareholder").
305 See Goroff & Winters, supra note 60, at 373.
306 See Beware Politically Correct Investing, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 28, 1995, at
A2 (stating that CalPERS considers how companies treat their employees as an
investment criterion).
307 See Marlene Givant Star, Companies Act to Avoid Proxy Showdowns, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 22, 1993, at 3, 39 (reporting that the Sun Company, Inc., has
become the first Fortune 500 firm to agree to sign a set of environmental guidelines
which were backed by large pension funds).
"I See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995)
(claiming that despite the existence of the poison pill, "a proxy contest apparently
remained a viable alternative" for the potential acquiror to pursue); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (stating that if a challenger for
control wanted to eliminate the company's poison pill, she could "solicit proxies for
consents to remove the Board and redeem the Rights"); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (stating that "[i]f the stockholders are
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out").
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The supreme court made its clearest statement about the value
of shareholder voting in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc. 9  The directors of Paramount, a large, publicly
owned company, were planning to sell their firm to Viacom, a firm
with a controlling shareholder.' Paramount was also being
pursued by QVG, but the affection was not mutual.3 ' In order to
assure that the Viacom transaction would be consummated, the
Paramount board guaranteed Viacom a $100 million termination fee
in case the deal fell through, a "no shop" provision declaring that
Paramount would not solicit any other offers, and a stock option
agreement, ensuring that Viacom would profit handsomely if another
company bought Paramount.3 12 The court found that because the
transaction would render the Paramount shareholders a minority in
the new enterprise, this was one of the rare situations where directors
were obligated to get "the best value reasonably available for the
stockholders."318 Because the Paramount directors had agreed to
the "no shop" provision, the stock option agreement and the large
termination fee, they had "squandered" their chance to seek the best
value available for their shareholders and thereby were in violation
of their fiduciary duties. 4
The court's reasoning reflected a great concern for the value of
the shareholder franchise. In a firm without a controlling share-
holder, each individual shareholder would have a say in the running
of the firm. They would be able to vote on "elections of directors,
amendments to the certificate of incorporation, mergers, consolida-
tions, sales of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation,
319 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994) (holding that the directors violated their fiduciary
duties when they did not endeavor to get the "best value reasonably available to the
stockholders" in a sale of control situation). See generally StevenJ. Fink, The Rebirth of
the Tender Offer? Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 20 DEL J.
CORP. L. 133 (1995);Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a "New"Interpretation of
the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV.
609 (1995).
10 SeeParamoun4 637 A.2d at 37, 38 (stating that while Paramount's stock was held
by numerous unaffiliated investors, 85% of the shares of Viacom were owned by a
single individual).
See id. at 41 (declaring that "the Paramount Board determined that the new
QVC offer was not in the best interests of the stockholders").
312 See id. at 39.
ss Id. at 44. The court stated that "when a corporation undertakes a transaction
which will cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or (b) a break-up of the
corporate entity, the directors' obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available
to the stockholders." Id. at 48.
s14 Id. at 50.
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and dissolution."" 5 After the "sale of control," the Paramount
shareholders would be minority shareholders of the Viacom
corporation. Thus, these protective devices would become mere
formalities as the controlling shareholder would be able to run the
company as he saw fit. 16
It is important to appreciate that the supreme court cited many
of the cases in which voting rights were held inviolate. 17 The
court did not speak of agency costs, collective action problems or
rational apathy. It spoke of the vote as something of value, an
important protection which cannot be taken from the shareholder
without adequate reimbursement.
3 18
In other cases, the courts have clearly expressed the importance
of the franchise. In Stahl I, the chancery court declared "the
prospect of losing a validly conducted shareholder vote cannot...
"1 Id. at 42 (citing the relevant sections of the Delaware corporate code).
316 See id. at 42-43 (arguing that "[i]n the absence of devices protecting the
minority shareholders, stockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where
there is a majority stockholder"). The court's analysis is reminiscent of that of
Professor Manne, who suggested in 1965 that the value of a share is composed of two
interests-the vote and the underlying investment interest. The vote has value in that
it can be used to improve corporate performance through a change in management.
If for any reason the shareholders could not implement a change in control, the vote
becomes worthless. See Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1430-31 (1965).
317 The court declared that "[b]ecause of the overriding importance of voting
rights, this Court and the Court of Chancery have consistently acted to protect
stockholders from unwarranted interference with such rights." Paramount 637 A.2d
at 42. The court cited Schnell and Blasius to support this proposition. See id. at 42
n.11.
318 The court claimed that this value was a "control premium," which is reflected
in the above-market-price paid for a controlling block of shares. The source of this
control premium is a subject of no small dispute. See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d
297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994) (stating that "[o]ptimists see the control premium as a
reflection of the efficiency enhancing changes that the buyer of control is planning,"
while others see it as "the price that a prospective wrongdoer is willing to pay in order
to put himself in the position to exploit [the shareholder]"); Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 715-20 (1982)
(arguing that requiring the control premium to be shared by all shareholders would
stifle efficient sales of control); Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions:
Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 248, 252-61 (1985) (discussing the
longstanding academic dispute regarding the source of the premium); Lynn A. Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99
YALE LJ. 1235, 1247 (1990) (arguing that control premiums reflect nothing more
than the "downward-sloping demand" for the shares of a firm (citation omitted)). See
generally DAVID CoWAN BAYNE, S.J., THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1986).
Father Bayne attacks the policy of allowing controlling shareholders to retain the
control premium as a moral wrong, a perversion and as the legalization of bribery.
See id. at 197-236.
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constitute a legitimate threat to a corporate interest, at least if one
accepts the traditional model of the nature of the corporation that
sees shareholders as 'owners."' 19 It is apparent from cases such as
Paramount that the courts have not abandoned the "shareholder as
owner" conception of the firm. While the courts will allow directors
to be sensitive to the concerns of "other 'corporate constituencies,'
the underlying duty of directors is to run the firm with "due care and
in a way intended to maximize the long run interests of sharehold-
ers."
320
4. The Vote Protects the Legitimacy of the Corporate Form
In Blasius, the chancery court asserted: "[W]hether the vote is
seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an important
tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory that
legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers)
over vast aggregations of property that they do not own."3 2'
There is no need to repeat the history of organizations where
small groups have been vested with great power over many, free from
oversight. Much of the world has been controlled on the idea that
the citizen did not have the foresight, intelligence or ability to have
a say in the manner in which she was governed. Rather, leadership
would spring from an elite, who could be trusted to manage with
wisdom, compassion and insight. This model has proven to be an
utter failure. The idea of democratic control is a sacred one to our
society. The courts must appreciate that, like the leaders of
government, the elected leaders of a corporation must be held
accountable for their actions. For the first time since economies of
scale created the need for numerous small owners and a professional
class of managers, shareholders are in a position actively to oversee
the management of the firm. These shareholders include retirees,
employees, community activists, environmental groups-all of the
constituencies that the courts aim to protect. The only way to give
them true protection is for the courts to ensure that management
cannot interfere with the shareholder franchise.
" Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl ).
521 TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. CIVA .10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
"2 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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5. The Vote Is the Shareholder's Defense of Last Resort
Finally, we must recognize that the shareholder franchise is the
monitoring tool of last resort. 22 The courts, the state legislatures
and the financial markets have eliminated the unsolicited tender
offer as a means of transferring corporate control. When the Time
court rejected Interco, it did so because of the fear that courts would
substitute their judgment "for that of a corporation's board of
directors.3 2 If the board's business judgment is faulty, a court will
not be able to correct it. The only monitoring mechanism left is the
shareholder vote. This vote now has become valuable, as institutions
can use it effectively. To allow management to interfere with the
shareholder franchise would effectively end any hope for real
oversight and would leave the main engine for economic growth in
our society in the hands of a small, isolated group, rather than in the
control of the tens of millions of shareholders who have provided
their hard-earned capital.
There are two ways that management can protect itself from
being ousted by the shareholders. The first is to enhance the value
of the company to ensure that shareholders are satisfied with
managerial performance. The second is to put up roadblocks to
proxy contests.3 24 The courts must ensure that directors choose the
former. Corporate management realizes that its control is being
threatened and is using every weapon in its arsenal to limit the
burgeoning shareholder power. The courts must not let this effort
succeed.
V. THE COURTS MUST RESTRICT ALL INTERFERENCE WITH THE
SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE, PURPOSEFUL AND OTHERWISE
52 See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995)
(stating that the proxy contest is "'the only alternative to hostile takeovers to gain
control against the will of the incumbent directors'" (quoting Bebchuk & Kahan, supra
note 29, at 1134)).
323 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1989).
124 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 29, at 1101 (describing managerial "[ojuster-
preventive activities").
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A. Shareholder Franchise-No Compromise
Delaware case law concerning shareholder franchise had a
promising beginning, but is now moving rapidly in the wrong
direction. Rather than applying the clear, sound Blasius compelling-
justification test, the courts are now trying to apply a balancing test
to managerial interference with the election process. There are two
major problems with the courts' decisions. First, the courts are
beginning to analyze cases in which the corporation purposefully
interferes with the shareholder franchise under the liberal Unocal
enhanced-businessjudgment standard. Second, the courts are
refusing to restrict companies whose otherwise valid defensive
measures, such as poison pills and employee stock option plans, have
the effect of impeding the shareholder franchise. This Comment
argues that the courts are not doing enough to defend the share-
holder franchise from the growing threat of corporate defensive
measures. The shareholder vote is not something which can be
balanced against other interests. No threat justifies curtailing the
shareholders' ability to remove managers with whom they disagree.
To analyze the situation properly, it is important to realize that
shareholder franchise cases come in two flavors-purposeful
interference and nonpurposeful interference. Although this
Comment discusses the purposeful interference cases first, it is the
nonpurposeful interference cases which pose the greatest menace to
shareholders. This is because a manager can construct permanent
structural barriers to shareholder voting through legal defensive
measures such as limitations on ownership and the placement of
shares in friendly hands. While the purposeful interference cases
may cause the temporary delay of an election, a poison pill with a low
trigger could permanently entrench management.
1. Purposeful Interference Cases-No Balancing Allowed
According to the Delaware Supreme Court's most recent holding
on the subject, when an acquiror launches both a proxy fight and a
tender offer, the court must decide the case under the Unocal test,
but also must recognize "the special import of protecting the
shareholder's franchise within Unoca's requirement that a defensive
response be reasonable and proportionate." 25 This raises the
question of what kind of threat can justify delaying or otherwise
5 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1379.
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interfering with a shareholder election. The court implied that a
hostile tender offerjoined with a proxy contest could be considered
a threat to the firm. Ultimately, though, it is not the hostile offer
from which management is defending itself. The poison pill and
other defensive measures can easily repulse a hostile offer. Rather,
it is the shareholders that the board is concerned about, because it
is they who would change management. The defensive measure is
not aimed against the tender offer, but against the proxy contest.
Why would a proxy contest be a threat to management? The
court has spoken of shareholder ignorance in the tender offer cases,
but if ignorance is a major concern, why hold elections at all?
26
The real answer is that no threat can possibly justify interfering with
the shareholder franchise. Managers may claim, and the courts may
agree, that the company is delaying an election for the benefit of the
shareholders out of concern that shareholders will make a poor,
uninformed decision. 27 But this has the process backwards. The
vote exists so that shareholders can remove managers who make
poor, uninformed decisions.
The vote is the only effective tool shareholders have to discipline
management. The supreme court should reject this invalid balancing
test and return to the original Blasius "compelling justification" test.
The difficulty with the balancing test, as was seen in the Unocall
Time! Unitrin decisions, is that the courts are seldom prepared to tell
management that its decisions are unreasonable. 28 In an area as
vital to corporate law as the shareholder franchise, the courts need
to apply a test that puts a heavy burden on management to prove
that it has a compelling justification for its actions.
26 See, e.g., Time, 571 A.2d at 1153 (stating that "[o]ne concern was that Time
shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance or a
mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner
might produce").
327 See, e.g., Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 494-95 (Del. Ch.) (stating that
a bylaw amendment delaying an election was justified in the face of a joint proxy
contest/tender offer), affd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995). But see Blasius Indus., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (declaring that the fact that"the board
knows better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation's best interest [is]
irrelevant... when the question is who should comprise the board of directors").
328 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,45-46
(Del. 1994) (stating that "courts will not substitute their business judgment for that
of the directors, but will determine if the directors' decision was, on balance, within
a range of reasonableness").
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Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 9 presented
one such justification for delaying a shareholder vote. In that case,
the supreme court held that when there is to be a sale of control, the
directors have a duty to get the "best value reasonably available to the
stockholders."8 ° In a situation where the opponent in a proxy
contest is currently a significant shareholder of the firm, the
directors should be allowed temporarily to delay an election if they
believe that they can find the shareholders a better deal right away.
The reason for this exception to the general rule is that once the
significant shareholder takes control of the board, she will become
a controlling shareholder and will be allowed to retain any control
premium on the sale of the firm.3 ' In a number of cases decided
before Paramount, the courts seem to be applying this "controlling
shareholder" logic. In Stahl I, the chancery court declared that
management could delay an election that had been scheduled but
not called. 32 Although the court technically based its holding on
the formality of setting an election date, the decision may be seen as
allowing management time to find an "attractive alternate" transac-
tion when there was a strong possibility that a majority shareholder
would be assuming control of the firm."' In Blasius, the court was
faced with a similar situation, but the acquirors were not large
enough to be controlling shareholders. In rejecting the attempt to
impede the election, the court stated that "[t]he board was not faced
with a coercive action taken by a powerful shareholder .... It was
presented with a consent solicitation by a 9% shareholder."3 4 The
advantage of this analysis is that it gives very clear rules about when
management should be allowed to delay or otherwise purposely
interfere with an election. Without these clear rules, the law in this
329 Id.
s3 Id. at 43.
' SeeMendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994) (stating that "[tlhe law
has acknowledged, albeit in a guarded and complex way, the legitimacy of the
acceptance by controlling shareholders of a control premium"); see also F. H. O'NEAL
& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORiY SHAREHOLDERS ch. 4 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing the sale of control case law).
32 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (Stahl I)
(asserting that fixing the date of an annual meeting is "an act of some dignity and
significance").
1 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A.11510, 1990 WL 114222 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl fl) (finding that Stahl, as a 30% shareholder, would likely win a
proxy contest). Even though Stahl H was a separate decision, the underlying fact
pattern was the same in both cases.
33 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662-63 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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area becomes muddled, as was seen in the Kidsco33 case. The
Unocal/ Unitrin analysis is a business judgment test, where the court
will determine if management's response to a threat was a "propor-
tionate" one and "on balance, within a range of reasonableness."
33 6
Because the shareholder vote, whether joined with a tender offer or
not, cannot be a threat, there can be no managerial response which
can be proportionate or reasonable. Only when it is apparent that
control of the firm will shift from the shareholders to the proxy
opponent will management have the right to interfere temporarily
with the vote if it reasonably believes that it can find the shareholders
a better immediate price through a different transaction.
2. Nonpurposeful Interference-An Outcome Orientation
To a shareholder who cannot conduct an effective proxy contest
because of a firm's poison pill ownership limitation, it does not
matter whether the impediment to the vote is the "primary purpose"
of the defensive measure. The shareholder is concerned with the
effect of the measure, not its purpose. The Delaware courts believe
otherwise. In cases such as Moran,33 7 Moore,33 8 Shamrock,33 9 Stahl
L040 and Unitrin,41 the courts refused to find that defensive mea-
sures were an invalid limitation on the shareholder franchise because
the impediment to the vote was not the "primary purpose" of the
transaction. In other cases, the courts found the impediments
invalid, but only because they determined that obstruction of the
proxy constituted the "primary purpose" of the measure. 42  The
11 Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del.
1995).
336 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995).
-"7 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985) (finding
that the effect of a 20% ownership ceiling on proxy contests is "minimal").
"8 See Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1563 (D.
Del. 1995) ("[R]etention of the pill will have no effect on the success of the proxy
contest.").
11 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch.
1989) ("The effect of the Management Transactions ... does not provide strong
evidence of a primary purpose to interfere with the election.").
s40 See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIVAA11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stahl fl) (stating that "the restrictions imposed by the stock rights
plan on a proxy contest were immaterial").
341 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383 ("The key variable in a proxy contest would be the
merit of American General's issues, not the size of its stockholdings." (citing Moran,
500 A.2d at 1355)).
m See, e.g., WNH Invs. v. Batzel, No. CIV.A.13931, 1995 WL 262248, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 28, 1995) ("The circumstances compel the conclusion that the purpose of the
SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE-NO COMPROMISE
Stahl H- court went so far as to state that "board action taken in good
faith and advisedly may be valid even though it affects in some
respects the exercise of the franchise." 4 '
The shareholder franchise is so vital to the proper functioning of
the corporate structure that even unintended interference with the
vote should be prohibited. The courts need to scrutinize carefully all
board actions that create impediments to shareholder voting and
determine the extent of the interference. They should use all
available data to identify potential harm. For example, even though
the Delaware courts claim that the effect of a poison pill on a proxy
contest "will be minimal,""g recent studies have found other-
wise."' Under an effects test analysis, courts will have to take the
studies into account in their decisions.
This Comment suggests that courts should not only examine the
purpose of a defensive measure, but also its effect. As proxy contests
become more frequent, boards increasingly will implement structural
impediments to the proxy, while arguing that the effect on the vote
is "secondary." An effects test will save a court from having to
inquire into the specific motivation of each corporate defensive
decision, which makes the test very practical. Because of the growing
threat to incumbency posed by proxy contests, a court can safely
assume that when a defensive measure impedes the shareholder
franchise, the results were not entirely unintended.
dilutive issuance was to defeat the challenge to the board's control."); Williams v.
Geier, No. CIV.A.8456, 1994 WL 514871, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1994) ("[T]he fact
that a plan has an entrenchment effect does not mean that it was so motivated."),
aff'd, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996); Commonwealth Assoc. v. Providence Health Care,
Inc., No. CIV.A.13135, 1993 WL 432779, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993) (finding that
"the effect that stock placement had on the consent solicitation was not collateral or
secondary but was the main, principal, indeed probably the sole reason" for the deal
in question); Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 186 (Del. Ch. 1993) ("These cases
stand for the proposition that directors may not act to frustrate the efforts of
stockholders to elect new directors by engaging in transactions that are designed and
pursued for the primary purpose of diluting the votes held by the insurgent stockhold-
ers."); Packer v. Yampol, No. CIV.A.8432, 1986 WL 4748, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,
1986) ("An inequitable purpose can be inferred where the directors' conduct has the
effect of being unnecessary under the circumstances, of thwarting shareholder
opposition, and of perpetuating management in office." (citing Lerman v. Diagnostic
Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 912 (Del. Ch. 1980))).
34 Stahl I, 1990 WL 114222, at *6.
a" Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
a See, e.g., Thomas & Martin, supra note 16, at 336 (finding that "limits on
dissident stock ownership negatively affect the likelihood of dissident success in a
proxy contest").
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There are a number of precedents for this type of analysis. In
Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, Inc., an otherwise
legitimate advance notice bylaw was found to have been inequitably
applied because "the policy underlying the shareholders' fundamen-
tal right to exercise their franchise significantly outweighs the
policies favoring the continued enforcement of the by-law." 48
Likewise, the legitimate policy behind allowing companies to enact
poison pills and other defenses must be subordinated to the
overriding importance of protecting the shareholder franchise.3 4
Interference with the vote is not a Boolean function. There are
many degrees of obstruction and levels of impediments. The courts'
decisions need to reflect this reality. In order to identify when an
otherwise legitimate defensive measure presents an impediment to
the shareholder franchise that requires a judicial remedy, a court
should analyze and weigh several factors.
First, a court should identify the relative strengths of the protago-
nists. A weak insurgent battling for control of a company whose
board controls 35% of the stock is especially susceptible to harm
from an ownership limit or a further transfer of stock into friendly
346 No. CIV.A.11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991). The
extenuating circumstance in this case was that the board had made a last-minute
decision to change their policy. Had the plaintiffs known about this change in
advance, they would have run a competing slate at the annual meeting. They did not
find out about the change, though, until after the advance notice deadline had
expired. See id. at *4.
"4 It is important to recognize that this analysis should not apply to transactions
that are not defensive, but have a valid business justification:
[A]cts taken in the ordinary course of the company's business, or indeed
extraordinary transactions, may have collateral effects upon a forthcoming
vote. Any such effect, however, does not constitute an equitable wrong;
directors [sic] duty of loyalty to shareholders does not require them to stop
managing the enterprise in good faith while a proxy contest or consent
solicitation goes forward.
Commonwealth Assoc. v. Providence Health Care, Inc., No. CIV.A.13931, 1993 WL
432779, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 1993); see also Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176,
184 (Del. Ch. 1993) (stating that an incumbent-perpetuating effect "does not itself
provide a ground to invalidate board action; rather it is the purpose that motivates the
board to take action having that effect that is critical"). In Glazer, the court also stated
that the principle in Blasius and Schnell does not
require that management refrain from issuing voting securities, and thereby
diluting [sic] the voting strength of insurgent stockholders, during the
pendency of a proxy contest, when the issuance legitimately has a primary
purpose directed to the management of the corporation and its business.




hands. On the other hand, when the board and other insiders own
a small percentage of the stock, and the challenger is a 30%
shareholder, defensive measures that limit ownership probably will
not have a harmful effect on the shareholder's chances." a The
court should apply the same analysis to the effects of other types of
structural impediments, such as supermajority voting provisions,
advance notice requirements and defensive recapitalizations.
Another factor a court should consider in weighing the effect of
a defensive measure on a proxy fight is the nature of a firm's stock
ownership. When a company has a large institutional ownership, it
is less likely that a defensive employee-stock-option plan or a poison
pill with a low trigger will substantially harm the insurgent's
chances 49 Likewise, when a firm's stock is held by speculators and
arbitrageurs, the proxy contestant need not concern herself with
shareholder apathy 50 In a firm with rationally apathetic share-
holders with relatively small holdings, however, a lower level of
interference may be enough to damage seriously a shareholder's
chances for victory.
Another factor a court should consider is whether the firm has
put up other roadblocks to a successful proxy contest. A company
that does not allow consents, special elections or cumulative voting,
but has a classified board, should not be given the ability to enact
further defensive measures that interfere with an election.
The final factor is whether there has been any statistical analysis
of whether the defensive measure in question affects proxy fights. A
number of studies have been done involving poison pill limitations
on shareholder ownership."51 One study found that, while a 20%
" See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A.11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Stah 11I) (arguing that when the opponent is a 30% shareholder,
an ownership limitation and association restriction would have no effect on the
outcome of the contest).
" See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1995)
("[Institutions] are more likely than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to
vote against manager proposals, and more likely to vote for proposals by other
shareholders." (quoting Black, supra note 224, at 925)); see also Aprahamian v. HBO
& Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987) (declaring that corporate management
cannot further delay the annual meeting with the excuse that stockholders needed to
review information because it is "obvious that the stock is now heavily owned by
sophisticated institutional investors and arbitrageurs who are likely to be well-informed
about what is happening in this on-going proxy contest").
"5 Cf Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch.
1989) (noting that "at least 22% of Polaroid's outstanding stock is held by arbitrageurs
and other 'short term' investors").
35 See generally Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities:
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ownership ceiling will not have a strong negative impact on the
shareholder's chances, a 10% trigger will be harmful.1
52
If, after the court has performed this "level of interference" test,
it determines that the franchise is impeded, it must find a remedy.
When the interference is significant enough, the court should
require the company to drop its defenses. In other cases the court
may be reluctant to force a firm to open itself up to potential hostile
tender offers. A better solution would be to tailor the remedy
specifically to improve a challenger's ability to win a proxy contest.
For example, when a company's defenses have the effect of impeding
a proxy contest, the court could order the company to reimburse its
opponent's proxy expenses."' 3 This would encourage proxy con-
tests against the firm that would otherwise be too expensive to
undertake and would also discourage firms from interfering with the
vote since to do so would be costly.
In the case of a poison pill defense, the court should require the
company to adjust its trigger level if that level is set so low that it
begins to interfere with the electoral process. Likewise, defensive
funding of an employee stock option plan could be limited to
prevent the firm from significantly hindering a proxy fight.
This type of analysis requires a more active judicial response than
the courts are currently willing to perform. The courts claim that
they will not "substitute their business judgment for that of the direc-
tors.""5 4 It is important to understand, however, that defensive
measures that interfere with the shareholder franchise do not
constitute transactions where a court should respect the managers'
business judgment. Rather, the importance of the shareholder
franchise demands that courts consider these transactions as being
self-interested, because restrictions on shareholder voting eliminate
the oversight which restrains managerial behavior.
Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structur, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347 (1988)
(showing a reduction in stockholder wealth); Pound, supra note 27, at 237 (conclud-
ing that the proxy system is burdened with an inefficient incentive structure which
benefits management); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on
Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 877 (1988) (finding a detrimental effect on
shareholder wealth); Thomas & Martin, supra note 16 (concluding that rights plans
can benefit dissidents or management).
552 See Thomas & Martin, supra note 16, at 336-37.
s Cf Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 29, at 1113-22 (discussing the merits of partial
reimbursement of challengers in a proxy contest).
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC




The shareholder franchise is becoming an increasingly important
tool for monitoring management and enhancing corporate efficiency.
Institutional investors are beginning to confront underperforming
companies and to demand that management be more responsive to
shareholder concerns. Corporate government, not surprisingly, is
resisting this trend by erecting barriers to the election process. The
courts understand the importance of shareholder voting but are
reluctant to declare that these management tactics are inequitable.
Part of this reluctance stems from the fact that the courts recently
confronted a similar issue when management defended itself against
the hostile tender offer. There, the courts spent years trying to set
a limit on managerial behavior, but ultimately gave up, deferring to
the board's judgment in the vast majority of cases. The courts
appear to be moving in this direction with the shareholder franchise
cases, declaring that impediments to the franchise must be balanced,
reasonable and proportionate. Thisjudicial deference to managerial
interference with the shareholder franchise is unwarranted and
unwise.
Eliminating the tender offer was harmful to shareholders, but
allowing management to interfere with the proxy would be devastat-
ing. Shareholder voting is the basis of the corporate form, and it
represents the crux of corporate efficiency. A manager who can
interfere with an election becomes her own boss, free from oversight
and external control. It is not surprising that management is
attempting to combat the growing shareholder power. It is surpris-
ing, however, that the courts have not responded to the threat these
measures pose to the corporation. Although management argues
that it needs to consider the interests of "other constituencies," its
true goal is more likely to entrench itself. Thus, we see cases where
management delays elections, packs boards, places shares in friendly
hands, and enacts advance notice provisions, all to preserve its power
over the corporation.
This Comment has argued that the courts must prevent these
intrusions, whether purposeful or not. Courts must carefully
examine any corporate defensive measure which impedes the
shareholder franchise, and they should remedy even a limited
interference with the vote. The courts must ensure that managers
remain accountable to the shareholders.
As the use of the proxy increases and shareholders begin to
exercise their power, management will undoubtedly expand its
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current defenses and enact new and more powerful ones. The same
arguments from the hostile takeover era will be heard again-
shareholders are uninformed, management needs to run the
corporation for the long run, and other constituencies must be
protected. This time the courts have to draw the line and demand
that the vote be absolutely protected. Unlike the tender offer, the
shareholder franchise goes to the fundamental question of corpora-
tion law-the allocation of power between principal and agent. A
determination that managers may set up defenses which "uninten-
tionally" impede shareholder voting will lead only to more advanced
and sophisticated "unintentional" impediments. The time to draw
the line is now, before the promise of shareholder monitoring is
thwarted, and the corporation becomes the private fiefdom of an
entrenched elite.
